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HOUSEKEEPING: THE NATURE AND
ALLOCATION OF WORK IN FEDERAL
TRIAL COURTS
Judith Resnik*
Those who would codify the meaning of words fight a
losing battle, for words, like the ideas and things they
are meant to signify, have a history.
JOAN WALLACH Scon, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY 29 (1988).
1. DEFINING "THE FEDERAL COURTS"
This lecture, entitled "Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation
of Work in the Federal Trial Courts," is the seventy-third in the
series named for John Sibley, a distinguished graduate of this law
schooP As only the second woman to give a Sibley lecture here,2 I
am pleased that this lecture is published as a part of a symposium
on Feminist Jurisprudence. As the title of this talk suggests, my
project (of which this is a piece) is to examine the ways in which
constructions and understandings of value-of what work and ac-
tivities are important and what are less important-operate in the
allocation of jurisdiction and authority in federal trial courts.
Use of the phrase "the federal courts" requires explanation. The
* Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center. M}'
thanks to Scott Altman, Milner Ball, Pat Cain, Denny Curtis, Suzanne Dohrer, Richard
Enslen, Ruth Gavison, Amy Hafey, Carolyn Heilbrun, Barbara Herman, Scott Hodgkins,
Vicki Jackson, Marty Levine, Rosalie Murphy, Richard Posner, Dorothy Resnik, Elaine
Scarry, Joan Schaffner, Vicki Schultz, Nomi Stolzenberg, Barrie Thorne, Mark Tushnet.
Catharine Wells, Chuck Weisselberg, Charles Whitebread, and to those at the Unh'ersity of
Georgia School of Law and at the University of Southern California Law Center with whom
I discussed this lecture. I appreciate the assistance of the law students on the University of
Georgia Law Review and their willingness to permit me to alter the current style of law
review footnotes to include the first names of authors of articles and books.
I Pope Brock, New U. Ga. Law Professorships Honor John Sibley, The Daily News (Ath·
ens, Ga.) Jan. 5, 1986, at 7, col. 1. My thanks to Jill Birch, Director of Alumni Affairs and
Development, for providing me with information about Mr. Sibley.
2 Ruth Bader Ginsburg being, once again, the first. See generally Deborah H. Marko\\itz,
In Pursuit of Equality: One Woman's Work to Change the Law, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.
73 (1989).
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topic of "the federal courts" as an object of scholarly inquiry is a
relatively recent one. In 1953, Henry Hart and Herbert Wechs-
ler-building on the work of Felix Frankfurter, James Landis, Wil-
bur Katz, and Harry Schulman3-wrote a book entitled The Fed-
eral Courts and the Federal System.4 That title used the words
"the federal courts" to denote a discussion principally focused on
the jurisdictional authority of judges who, upon nomination by the
President and consent of the Senate, are appointed pursuant to
Article III of the Constitution and enjoy life tenure and salaries
protected from diminution by Congress. Ii
Today, almost forty years later, the words "the federal courts"
and "the federal judiciary" are still commonly used to refer to that
set of judges who have life tenure ("Article III judges"), but the
equation is imprecise. "The federal courts" are also populated by
other "federal judges"-who work within the judicial branch but
who are creatures of congressional legislation. This group, loosely
(and, arguably, technically inaccurately) denominated "Article I
judges,"6 is comprised of bankruptcy judges and magistrates, all of
3 FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS. THE'BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY
IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1928); FELIX FRANKFURTER & WILBER G. KATZ. CASES AND
OTHER AUTHORITIES ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (1931); FELIX FRANKFUIlTEIl &
HARRY SCHULMAN. CASES AND AUTHORITIES ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDUIlE (rev.
ed. 1937). See generally Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and
the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 681-87 (1989); Ahkil Reed Amar, Law Story
(Book Review), 102 HARV. L. REV. 688 (1989) (reviewing PAUL M. BATOR. PAUL J. MISHKIN,
DANIEL J. MELTZER. & DAVID L. SHAPIRO. HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART AND WECHSLER]).
• HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 3.
• U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2.
• I use the phrase "Article I judges" to embrace those judgeships created by Congress but
lacking the Article III requirements of life tenure and salary protections. Some argue that,
because both magistrates and bankruptcy judges work within the judicial branch, as "ad-
juncts" to or "units" of Article III courts, magistrates and bankruptcy judges are not Article
I judges who (under this rubric) consist solely of those who work in agencies or other insti-
tutions, such as the military. With such distinctions, some judges may also appropriately be
described as "Article II judges." See United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.s. Court for
Berlin 1979) (trial conducted by United States, under aegis of State Department, of individ-
uals who hijacked a plane and landed in what was then West Berlin). One phrase to capture
all these variations would be to call these judges "non-Article III judges." Instead, I will use
"Article I" as the generic, which, at least as of this writing, captures much of the Supreme
Court jurisprudential approach about the extent to which Congress can create judgeships
that lack Article III attributes. See, for example, Grantinanceriera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S.
Ct. 2782 (1989), and Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982), both of which draw on cases about the constitutionality of Article I courts to analyze
the constitutionality of congressional grants of power to bankruptcy courts.
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whom lack life tenure and constitutionally protected salaries.
There are 575 Article III trial judges.7 There are 477 authorized
positions for federal magistrates, of which 307 are full-time jobs.
Magistrates are appointed by Article III trial judges and serve for a
term of eight years.s There are another 291 authorized full-time
bankruptcy judges, who are appointed by Article ill appellate
judges and who serve for fourteen-year terms.9 "Federal adjudica-
tion" also occurs in federal agencies, where 1116 administrative law
judges conduct hearings, make factual findings, and apply law to
fact to render decisions.lo
While the 575 Article III trial judges receive filings in some
235,000 civil cases and 46,000 criminal cases a year,ll federal bank-
ruptcy judges hear some 600,000 petitions a year, and relatively
few of those cases are seen by Article ill judges.12 As of 1987, fed-
7 1989 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REp. 46 (hereinafter 1989 AD-
MIN. OFFICE REPORT].
8 28 U.S.C. § 631(a), (e) (1988). One hundred sixty-one positions are part·time and nine
are "combined" positions that include duties of court clerks and magistrates. 1989 ADMIN.
OFFICE REpORT, sup;a note 7, at 47. See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITII, UNITED STATES MAGIS-
TRATES IN TilE FEDERAL COURTS: SUBORDINATE JUDGES (1990) (hereinafter CIlRISTOPIlER E.
SMITII. SUBORDINATE JUDGES].
• 28 U.S.C. §§ 152(a)(1)-(2), 153(a) (1988); 1989 JUDICIARY EQUAL EMPLO\'MENT OPPORTU-
NITY (EEO) PROGRAM ANN. REP. (prelim. ed.) (hereinafter 1989 EEO REPORT]. As of June
1990, 287 positions have been filled. The EQual Employment and Special Projects Office
"develops procedures and monitors programs and policies of the Judicial Confer-
ence-including providing advice on the operation of affirmative action plans and discrimi-
nation complaint procedures in the courts." Id.
10 Of the 1116 Administrative Law Judges, 802 are with the Social Security Administra-
tion. OFFICE OF ADr-UN. LAW JUDGES, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, STATISTICS (July
20, 1990) (on file with author). For descriptions of efforts to establish administrative law
judgeships which are "independent" of particular agencies, see Nahum Litt & Joseph J.
Simeone, An Administrative Law Judge Corps: Its Value and Relation to tile Traditional
System of Justice, 11 WHITTIER L. REv. 569 (1989) (describing S. 594, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.,
135 CONGo REC. 2710 (1989) (Admin. Law Judges Corps Act». For discUESion of the history
and selection of administrative law judges, see Jeffrey S. Lubbers, FederafAdministrative
Law Judges: A Focus on our Invisible Judiciary, 33 FED. ADMIN. L. REv. 109 (1981).
11 1989 ADMIN. OFFICE REPORT, supra note 7, at 11.
" For the year ending June 30, 1989, bankruptcy courts received 642,933 petitions. Id. at
26-27. During that year, Article III district judges considered 5558 bankruptcy cases, 4117 of
which were described as "appeals," while 1441 were cases in which a referral from a district
court to a bankruptcy court was withdrawn. Id. at 177. In addition, the Ninth Circuit. insti-
tuted an experiment, authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1988), that created bankruptcy ap-
pellate panels ("BAPs") which are three-member panels of bankruptc~' judges that. heard
"appeals" in lieu of district court judges. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COl-1M. REPORT 74 (Apr. 2,
1990) (hereinafter FCSC REPORT]. In 1989, 1134 cases were filed before the BAPs of which
475 were referred back to the district courts. Conversation with staff member, Administra-
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eral magistrates presided over some 500,000 judicial proceedings;
they conducted 134,000 preliminary hearings in felony cases, took
references from Article III judges to consider 197,000 civil and
criminal pretrial issues, considered 6500 social security "appeals"
and 27,000 prisoner filings, and "tried more than 95,000 misde-
meanors and 4900 civil cases on consent of the parties. "13 Federal
administrative law judges have a docket greater than that of the
Article III judiciary; for example, administrative law judges in the
Social Security Administration heard more than 250,000 cases in
1987.14
In short, "the federal courts" include many "judges" who lack
life tenure. At the trial level, non-tenured bankruptcy judges and
magistrates outnumber the tenured Article III judges and do a vast
amount of adjudicatory work. The growth of federal judicial busi-
ness and the proliferation of federal judicial institutions-both
twentieth-century phenomena15-prompt questions about "the
federal courts," about how to allocate work among the different
judges, and about what meaning and value to accord such work.
The development of new tiers of trial court decisionmakers and the
hierarchies currently being etched into federal trial court struc-
tures are the core of my concerns.
In one respect, these are constitutional questions: a spate of Su-
preme Court cases examine the constitutionality of congressional
schemes that create judicial officers who lack the Article III attrib-
utes of life tenure and salary guarantee but nonetheless decide fed-
tive Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankr. Division (Aug. 3, 1990). See generally Thomas E.
Carlson, The Case for Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 545, 546, 554·58.
At the circuit level, all the circuits received 1130 appeals in 1989.
13 S. REP. No. 293, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 5564, 5565. In 1989, federal magistrates conducted trials in 5354 civil consent
cases and handled 117,804 civil matters of which 6721 were social security cases (probably
the same category of cases as the "social security appeals" referred to in the 1988 congres-
sional hearings). 1989 ADMIN. OFFICE REPORT, supra note 7, at 29-33.
.. Richard E. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations: Recommendations for Re·
form, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 481.
.. See generally WOLF HEYDERBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: TilE Po·
LITICAL ECONOMY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 1 (1990) ("quiet revolution" has occurred
consisting of changes in "the forms of case disposition," in the "growth in the range, varia·
bility, and complexity of demands on federal district courts as well as the addition of a host
of new organizational actors, including court managers, computer experts, parajudges, and
support staff").
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eral cases. I am not going to explore the interstices of these cases.lEI
I am, instead, interested in the construction of the value of the
work of the various sets of judges-what is deemed worthy work
for Article III judges, what role is accorded non-Article III judges,
and what explanations are offered about the assignments of differ-
ently chartered judges.
My interest in the allocation and value of work assignments
brings me to the other part of the title of this lecture: "housekeep-
ing." Although it may surprise those not steeped in discussions of
"the federal courts," the word "housekeeping" is used with fair fre-
quency in the federal courts. In this, the latter part of the twenti-
eth century, the term "housekeeping"-as a description of certain
kinds of judicial or legislative decisions-has become quite com-
mon, but when that label attached has not been the source of in-
-quiry. My purpose here is to chart the changing use over the past
two centuries of the term "housekeeping" in "the federal courts."
As is developed below, that deployment is complex; Article III
judges sometimes use the term to claim statutes, rules, and prac-
tices to be "housekeeping," sometimes dismiss them as "mere
housekeeping," and sometimes describe them as the opposite of
"housekeeping." Some "housekeeping" is the routine; some of it
the unimportant, and some of it work that may be important but
to which not too much attention need be paid. Only during the last
few decades has the label "housekeeping" come to be used to trivi-
alize-to allege that a given statute/rule/practice is less important
than another to which it is compared and to divert attention away
from the nature and meaning of the "housekeeping" practice in
question-even as that practice, so labeled, may then be followed.
This lecture cannot convey all of the richness of the usage of
"housekeeping" nor all its variations. Further, "housekeeping"
captures some but not all of the aspects of the hierarchy-in-the-
making in the federal trial courts. But juxtaposing the ways in
which the word "housekeeping" has been used against the ways in
which work is allocated among federal trial court judges under-
scores the divisions of labor now in development and the value be-
16 See generally Richard Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administratice Agencies, And Ar-
ticle III, 101 HARv. L. REv. 915' (1988); Daniel Meltzer, Legislatice Courts, Legislatice
Power, and the Constitution, 65 IND. L.J. 291 (1990); Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning
of Article III Courts, 56 COLO. L. REv. 581 (1985).
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ing assigned to the daily work of interacting with litigants and law·
yers. The activities most dependent on interactions (often messy,
sometimes contentious, occasionally rewarding) with litigants and
lawyers are those undertaken by the trial bench, Article III or Arti·
cle 1. Those activities are the ones to which less political and aca·
demic attention is being paid; current proposals would increase the
distance of the more elite judges from that work. As "housekeep-
ing" became the province for women during the nineteenth cen·
tury, and as women's province was devalued, so are the activities of
trial court judges increasingly becoming the domain of Article I
judges and so is that province being devalued and ignored. Re·
sponses to women's devaluation include seeking access to some as·
peets of the male world that have been blocked, demanding that
men do some of the work assigned to women, and arguing for ap-
preciation of the value of work associated with women; the possi-
bility of a parallel reallocation and reevaluation of work between
Article I and Article III judges is a topic for another essay. My
purpose here is to map the hierarchy and valuations being made
and to question their wisdom.
II. AFFIXING THE LABEL "HOUSEKEEPING"
In discussions of federal courts and procedure, a stock term is
available (if one chooses to use it) to describe some practice or rule
as unimportant, trivial, or not worthy of much attention. One can
say: that is a "housekeeping rule." For example, when Justices
Black and Douglas dissented in the 1960s from the promulgation
of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the
grounds that such rulemaking authority was inappropriately
lodged with the Supreme Court, the justices wrote:
We believe that while some of the Rules of Civil Proce·
dure are simply housekeeping details, many determine
matters so substantially affecting the rights of litigants in
lawsuits that in practical effect they are the equivalent of
I . I t' 17new egIS a IOn . . . .
This "housekeeping" is to be distinguished from other activity that
is more substantive and consequential. Those of us who have kept
11 Statement of Justice Black and Justice Douglas on the Promulgation of Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 374 U.S. 865, 865·66 (1963) (footnote omitted).
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house or who have shared the tasks of housekeeping do not neces-
sarily find comfortable the use of the term "housekeeping" to
mean an activity of subordinate importance. By looking more
closely at how the actual word "housekeeping" has been used over
time by Article III judges in the federal courts, one can trace the
changes in use. By looking beyond Article III judges to the culture
of which they are a part, one can explain, in part, how "housekeep-
ing" could become an adjective of trivialization.
A. Tracking the Use of the Word "Housekeeping"
With the miracles of computers and data bases,18 it is possible to
find the cases in which Article III judges used the word "house-
keeping" and to learn whether the usage has changed over time.
Because the United States Supreme Court issues fewer opinions
than the lower federal courts, tracing its use of the word "house-
keeping" is somewhat easier than tracing lower Article ill judges'
use of the word. From its first term until March of 1990, the
United States Supreme Court has used the word "housekeeping"
in forty-four cases.19 The first use that we (Rosalie Murphy, Joan
Schaffner, and 1) could find was in 1826; from then until 1944, the
Supreme Court used the word "housekeeping" in only eight
cases.20 In each use, the reference was to the literal activity of
keeping house.
18 And with the extraordinary assistance of Rosalie Murphy and Joan SchatTner.I. Westlaw has two United States Supreme Court data bases; one is from 1789 to 1944
and the second is from 1945 to the present. The number comes from looking for the word
"housekeeping" or "house-keeping" in only the text of the opinion, rather than in either the
headnotes or the syllabus which are not written by members of the Court. For Supreme
Court cases, our search of the second period spanned from 1945 until March 17, 1990; for
the lower courts, the search included cases published and reported on Westlaw as of March
10,1990.
20 First use: Shelby v. Guy, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 361 (1826). See infra note 23. In two
additional cases, the word "housekeeping" appears in the syllabus of the case, but not in the
opinions. See Harkness & Wife v. Underhill, 66 U.S. (l Black) 316 (1861); Suydam v. Wil,
liamson, 61 U.S. (21 How.) 427 (1857) (both of which use the word in the sense of one who
keeps a house).
At a glance, it looks like the Supreme Court used the word "housekeeping" in more cases
in the last 45 years than in the rest of its tenure. In an absolute sense, the Court wrote the
word "housekeeping" in more cases from 1945·1990 than it had from 1789·1944. However,
the length of opinions authored by the Supreme Court have also grown over the last four
decades, so the use of any word may well have increased with the increased volume of \\Tit-
ings. My interest is not in the frequency of use but in the nature of the use; as II conse-
quence, I have not attempted to gather data to address the frequency·of·use question.
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For example, a few cases deal with ownership of land obtained
by virtue of congressional acts giving rights to "settlers on public
lands"; housekeeping was one indication of living and work-
ing-hence of actually being a settler-on the land. As the text of
one of the acts put it: "all actual settlers, being house-keepers
upon the public lands, shall have the right of pre-emption."21
Housekeeping was relevant not only to land ownership but also to
other areas of law. Doctrines such as choice of law depended in
part upon the residence of an individual; for example, in a personal
injury action, proof of residence was argued on the basis that the
wife of an injured traveling salesperson had "hired a house and
went to house-keeping."22 Housekeeping was also, sadly, relevant
to proof of ownership of slaves.23
In these cases, the United States Supreme Court described both
men and women as "housekeepers." Despite the emergence in the
nineteenth century of the cult of "domesticity"24 and the gender-
specific assignment of indoor home-maintenance work to women,
the Supreme Court usage continued in this century to include
women and men in the set of human beings who could be "house-
keepers." As late as 1942, in a case about the validity of a divorce
" Act of April 5, 1832, ch. 65, 4 Stat. 503, 22d Cong., 1st Sess. (1832). See also Hill v.
McCord, 195 U.S. 395, 401 (1904) (homesteaders had not abandoned land in part because
"[t]heir cabin and its housekeeping equipment were superior to those of most homestead·
ers"): Orchard v. Alexander, 157 U.S. 372, 379 (1895) ("false proofs of settlement, occupancy
and housekeeping may be set aside"); O'Brien v. Perry, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 132, 139 (1861)
(explaining that ownership of land depends upon "actual settlement and housekeeping"),
•• Penfield v. Chesapeake, Ohio, and S.W. R.R., 134 U.S. 351, 355 (1890).
23 See Shelby v. Guy, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 361, 370 (1826) (describing a slave who went
with a couple "upon their going to house-keeping").
2. NANCY F. COIT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN NEW ENGLAND,
1780-1835 (1977). Cott described a cult of "domesticity" and the rise of the identification of
women's work with the home that emerged by the 1830s. Based upon a review of personal
diaries of 100 white middle-class and upper middle-class New England women who wrote
during the early part of the nineteenth century, Cott's research detailed the creation of what
she terms a "canon of domesticity." She traced how the growth of manufacturing and trades
moved the society from one in which women and men worked together to provide for a
household, to one in which men went "out into the world" to earn money, while women
maintained the home as a "haven" or "refuge" from that world. [d. at 19·125. See also
BARBARA LESLIE EpSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF DOMESTICITY: WOMEN, EVANGELISM AND TEMPEIt-
ANCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 67 (1981); DOLORES HAYDEN, REDESIGNING TilE
AMERICAN DREAM: THE FUTURE OF HOUSING, WORK, & FAMILY LIFE 73·75,209-10 (1984); AL-
ICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED
STATES at parts I & II (1982): DEBORAH RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 9-28 (1989) (Ch. I,
"Natural Rights and Natural Roles").
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obtained in Nevada, a member of the Court referred to the fact
that a couple "set up housekeeping as husband and wife."2li
During the last forty-five years, the use of the word "housekeep-
ing" by the United States Supreme Court has changed substan-
tially, In a few cases, the word has retained the earlier use-the
designation of some person or group as creating or living in a
shared household. For example, two cases involving substantive
due process and zoning laws discuss local ordinances that define a
"housekeeping unit."26 The scope of the word "housekeeping" has
also broadened. Over the past forty-five years, the Court began to
speak of housekeeping work that included not only the mainte-
nance of a family's personal home (let me call this the first sense of
the worq.) but also the maintenance of workplaces, factories, and
businesses (a second sense). For example, one Supreme Court case
refers to provisions in a contract for a gas station franchise-those
that relate to the "use and appearance of the station"-as
"'housekeeping' provisions."27 Another case relates to a question
of the jurisdiction of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation A.ct when a claim was brought by injured laborers
providing "housekeeping and janitorial services" for a terminal.28
In these cases, housekeeping denotes the cleaning and taking care
of businesses and public places.29
.. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 312 (l942) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
2. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 496 n.2 (l977) (local zoning ordinance
that prohibited a grandmother from living with her grandchildren ruled unconstitutional);
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I, 2 (1974) (disallowing constitutional challenge to
local ordinance about unrelated adults sharing housing). See also First Nat'l Maintenance
Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 668 (1981) ("housekeeping, cleaning, maintenance, and re-
lated services" were the business activities of an employer challenging a National Labor
Relations Board order): United States Dept. of Agrie. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 530 n.3
(1973) (federal regulations define a "household" to exclude "roomers, boarders, and unre-
lated live-in attendants necessary for medical, housekeeping, or child care reasons ••• ").
27 FTC v. Texaco, 393 U.S. 223, 227 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting). In the lower federnl
courts, a few cases involve the maintenance of factories or workplaces and speak of the
"housekeeping" of those facilities. See Korn Indus. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 117, 124 (4th Cir.
1967): Radiator Specialty Co. v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 495, 499 (4th Cir. 1964); Marshall Field &
Co. v. NLRB, 135 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 1943) (Minton, J., dissenting); Owens-Illinois Glass
Co. v. NLRB, 123 F.2d 670, 682 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 662 (l942).
.. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Schwalb, 110 S. Ct. 381, 383 (l989).
2. Members of the Supreme Court were not the only people to speak of the maintenance
and care of public places as "housekeeping." See DOLORES HAYDEN, supra note 24, at 30
(Frances Willard, President of the Women's Christian Temperance Union, had as a slogan
"municipal housekeeping"): SHEILA 1\1. ROTHMAN, WOMAN'S PROPER PLACE: A HISTOR\' OF
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Between 1945 and the present, the Supreme Court also used the
word "housekeeping" in a third way: housekeeping became an ad-
jective to indicate matters internal to an organization. For exam-
ple, when considering a conflict between federal arbitration provi-
sions and California labor law, the Court discussed whether the
Securities and Exchange Commission intended to require "nation-
wide uniformity of an exchange's housekeeping affairs."30 Borrow-
ing language from legislative hearings from the mid-1950s, the
United States Supreme Court also described the statute that au-
thorizes the heads of federal departments and agencies to make
rules for those departments as the federal "housekeeping stat-
ute."31 This statute regulates what the Supreme Court has called
the use and maintenance of "papers pertaining to the day-to-day
business of Government."32
CHANGING IDEALS AND PRACTICES: 1870 TO THE PRESENT 66-74 (1978) (Frances Willard ar·
gued for "the home going forth into the world." [d. at 67); Marlene Stein Wortman, Domes-
ticating the Nineteenth-Century American City, 1979 PROSPECTS 531, 565 ("domestic re·
formers" succeeded in defining "good municipal" governance as including "good
housekeeping"). See also HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 42 (1959):
Since the rise of society, since the admission of household and housekeeping
activities to the public realm, an irresistible tendency to grow, to devour the
older realms of the political and private as well as the more recently estab·
lished sphere of intimacy, has been one of the outstanding characteristics of
the new realm.
For commentary on Arendt's views, see Hanna Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private and
Public, 9 POLITICAL THEORY 327 (1981).
30 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987). See also Merrill Lynch v. Ware, 414 U.S.
117, 136 (1973) (arbitration of claims in the securities industry).
31 Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 309 n.39 (1979). 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1988) currently states:
The head of an Executive department or military department may prescribe
regulations for the government of his department, the conduct of its employ-
ees, the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and
preservation of its records, papers, and property. This section docs not author·
ize withholding information from the public or limiting the availability of
records to the public.
The statute dates from the immediate post-revolutionary period. See the provision for the
custody and papers of the Department of State, then known as the Department of Foreign
Affairs. Act of July 27, 1789, ch, 4, 1 Stat. 28 n.(a); Act of Sept. 15, 1789, ch, 14, 1 Stat. 68
("An Act to provide for the safe-keeping of the Acts, Records and Seals of the United.
States"). In 1873-74, the 1789 enactment was recodified. See REV. STAT. OF TilE UNITED
STATES § 161 (1873-74). In 1958, the recodification added the sentence: "This section does
not authorize withholding information from the public or limiting the availability of records
to the public." 5 U.S.C. § 22, 72 Stat. 547 (1958). The 1966 reenactment recodified the
statute to its current place, 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1988), and slightly modified the 1955 language.
32 Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 309 n.39 (1979) (such a statute does not include a
"substantive grant of legislative power to promulgate rules authorizing the release of trade
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Because the "federal housekeeping statute" is an important
source of judicial use of the word "housekeeping,"33 a bit of discus-
sion of legislative usage is in order.34 From one of the hearings
about revising the statute in the 19505 comes the following
exchange:
Comment: "Custody [of records] is safekeeping, and sup-
pression, I suppose, would be refusal to give them to any-
one. We do not do that."
Response: "Custody is housekeeping, is it not? "311
secrets"). See also United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 483 n.4 (1984) (for purposes of 18
U.S.C. § 1001 (1988), the federal judiciary may be a "department or agency" "with respect
to its housekeeping or administrative functions" but not when conducting judicial
proceedings).
33 See Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 309 n.39 ("The law has been called an office 'housekeeping'
statute, enacted to help General Washington get his administration underway by spelling
out the authority of executive officials to set up offices and file Government documents.").
34 By the middle of this century, the statute had been dubbed-in the legislative history
for its reenactment-the federal "housekeeping" statute. See H.R. REP. No. 1461, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3352.
I have not yet found the moment in time when this nickname attached. In the legislative
hearings in 1955, the earlier enactment of the statute was described as a "housekeeping
statute." See Availability of Information from Federal Department and Agencies: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1955) (testimony of Harold L. Cross, Freedom Information Counsel for Am. Soc'y of News·
·paper Editors, Nov. 7, 1955) [hereinafter Hearings: Availability of Information). In Part 3
of those hearings, on May 8, 1956, the subcommittee chair, John E. Moss, Jr., stated that
each member of the panel of attorneys who came to testify were sent a list of questions,
including whether "the Federal Government's basic housekeeping statute ••• [is) being tor-
tured into authority to restrict the flow of information," Id. at 427. See also Note, Discovery'
from the United States in Suits Between Private Litigants-The 1958 Amendment of the
Federal Housekeeping Statute, 69 YALE L.J. 452 (1960).
A few possible earlier references can be found. For example, in 1950, Raoul Berger and
Abe Krash referred to statutes that provide for recordkeeping as a "blend of 'housekeeping'
statutes" that formed the basis for the Attorney General's assertion of privilege. Raoul Ber-
ger & Abe Krash, Government Immunity from Discovery, 59 YALE L..J. 1451, 1460 n.50
(1950). Another mention of "housekeeping" comes in a 1948 district court decision about
whether to permit the federal government to maintain the secrecy of executive records.
Bank Line, Ltd. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 801, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (government interest
in the "secrecy of its house-keeping records"). See infra note 61 and accompanying text. In
the Bank Line case, the government based its claim of secrecy on regulations promulgated
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958), the predecessor to 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). 76 F. Supp. at
803 n.3. In making its claim for nondisclosure, the government argued that its records were
"housekeeping." Id. at 803. This is the first reference in case law that I found which links
"housekeeping" to the activities authorized by this section.
35 Hearings: Availability of Information, supra note 34, at 259 (exchange between Robert
L. Farrington, General Counsel Dep't of Agric. and Jacob Scher, Special Counsel, Subcomm.
on Gov't Information, Nov. 10, 1955).
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Another part of the hearings includes discussion of why there was
little prior legislative history on this statute. One witness argued
that:
There was no historymaking debate over Title 5, United
States Code, § 22, because it was not a historymaking
statute, it was not a historymaking bill, it was not a his-
torymaking proposal. If it had proposed secrecy it would
have been historymaking. But it didn't. It was just a
housekeeping statute, and as such raised none of the
great issues that would have aroused Madison, Jefferson,
Mason and the rest of the statesmen who put so much
trust in popular rights to information.36
These quotes provide an example of the fourth sense of the word
"housekeeping," as used in discussions in legislative history and in
court opinions. In addition to being the internal affairs of govern-
ment or its daily work, "housekeeping" also became the less impor-
tant affairs of government, the rules and practices (some but not
all procedural) to which one need not pay much attention. The Su-
preme Court picked up this fourth usage at about the same time
that the hearings on the 1955 revisions of the "federal housekeep-
ing statute" were underway. Starting at that time and continuing
to the present, the Supreme Court has talked about "housekeeping
rules,"37 "housekeeping matters,"38 federal "housekeeping mea-
sure[s],"39 and the "housekeeping statute."40
The first Supreme Court decision that I have found that in-
cludes one of these adjectival uses of "housekeeping" is the 1953
decision in Western Pacific Railroad Corporation v. Western Pa-
cific Railroad Company.41 In that dispute-between a corporation
3. Hearings: Availability of Information, supra note 34, at 3359 (statement of J. Russoll
Wiggins, Executive Editor, Washington Post and Times Herald, representing the Am. Soc'y
of Newspaper Editors, Feb. 7, 1958) (emphasis added).
31 See, e.g., Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 103 n.6 (1971); Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 473 (1965).
3. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 333 n.2 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Wal-
lis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 67 (1966).
3. Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 482 (1981); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254
(1981); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 366 (1974); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S.
612, 636 (1964).
'0 Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 309 n.39 (1979).
41 345 U.S. 247 (1953). This case has not been cited much, and the United States Suo
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and its former subsidiary over an accounting-the party that lost
an appeal requested but was denied a rehearing en bane. At that
point, another legal issue emerged-the meaning of a congressional
statute that had authorized appellate courts to sit in groups of
three. The Western Pacific Railroad Corporation argued that it
had a statutory right to compel each active member of an entire
appellate court (and not a division of three judges) to give formal
consideration to the request for rehearing.·2 The Supreme Court
held that the litigant had no such statutory right but gave the liti-
gant an opportunity to make an argument for en bane review
again.43 The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Vinson,
described the statute at issue as delineating "certain housekeeping
functions of a Court of Appeals-functions which cannot be dis-
charged by a court unless, on its own motion, it convenes itself as a
body and acts as a body-such as rule making, appointing clerks
and fixing the times when court shall be held."H Because the stat-
ute was about the court's internal workings, the provision con-
ferred no enforceable rights "to compel each member of the court
to give formal consideration" to a request for en banc review."li Lit-
igants could not invoke a statute delineating "housekeeping func-
tions" as a source of right.
Perhaps one of the most famous uses (at least for procedure/
federal courts aficionados) comes in the case of Hanna v. Plumer,"6
which addressed the question of whether federal courts in diversity
actions were to apply a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure directing
preme-Court has not referred to it since 1974. As the facts of the case indicate. the legal
issue arose in a world of appellate practice very different from the current one; today, the
issue is no longer how many Article III judges are obliged to hear a petition for rehearing,
but whether appellate review, as of right, in civil cases will last another fifty years. See
Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603 (1985).
.. 345 U.S. at 250-51. The statute relied on was 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) which pro\'ided that
cases "shall be heard ... by a court ..• of not more than three judges, unless a hearing or
rehearing before the court [e]n banc is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges •.• :'
•• 345 U.S. at 267-68.
•• [d. at 256.
•• [d. at 267. A few months thereafter, Justice Jackson, in dissent, used "housekeeping"
to denote something of lesser order; he argued that "many acts of government officials deal
only with the housekeeping side of federal activities"-and, therefore, should not be im-
mune from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S.
15, 60 (1953) (meaning of "discretionary function or duty" for which the United States is
not liable under the Act).
•• 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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the manner of service of process, or to apply a parallel state rule.
In mandating the use of the federal rules, the Court attempted to
distinguish between state "substantive" rules that had to be ap-
plied in diversity cases and federal "procedural" rules that, not-
withstanding the Erie opinion, could nonetheless still govern such
cases. As Chief Justice Earl Warren, for the Court, explained:
Erie and its offspring cast no doubt on the long-recog-
nized power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules
for federal courts even though some of those rules will
inevitably differ from comparable state rules.47
This usage makes the deployment of "housekeeping" more com-
plex, for with it comes authority to enforce rules and for litigants
to rely on such rules. The Court applied its own "housekeeping
rules" and thus paid attention to those rules, even as it simultane-
ously ignored another institution's "housekeeping" rules. In
Hanna, it is not that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are un-
important, for the Court's decision enabled a uniform set of proce-
dural rules to govern federal practice. But these procedural rules
were still not the "substance" of the matter; if "substantive," then
state rules of decision had to govern.
"Housekeeping" crops up in choice of law discussions other than
those involving the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; again, choice
turns on whether rules are "merely 'housekeeping' matters on
which state and federal courts may ordinarily differ" or not.48
What delineates "housekeeping matters" from others is not always
easy to identify. For example, according to the Supreme Court, a
federal venue statute that permits changes in the place of litigation
from one federal district court to another "should be regarded as a
federal judicial housekeeping measure,"49 although the common
law doctrine of dismissing lawsuits filed in an inconvenient forum
("forum non conveniens") is something more than a "federal
47 [d. at 473. ,
•• Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 67 (1966). See also Chevron Oil Co. v.
Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 103 n.6 (1971) (state statute of limitations to be applied since "[hlore
we are not dealing with mere 'housekeeping rules' embodied in state law")•
•• Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636 (1964). See also Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110
S. Ct. 1274, 1279 (1990) (citing Van Dusen); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22,
37 (1988) (citing Van Dusen) (venue as "housekeeping").
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housekeeping measure."15o Housekeeping-in Article ill courts-is
not used only to describe activities related to the place of litiga-
tion,151 the law governing the litigation, and the manner in which
litigation occurs; contracts can also have a "housekeeping detail."Ll2
And, as noted above, a good deal of what agencies and depart-
ments of the Executive branch do-such as the maintenance of
records and the promulgation of rules of operation-is also de-
scribed as "housekeeping."
In contrast to the Hanna v. Plumer line of cases, which simulta-
neously use the de~omination "housekeeping" as a basis for en-
forcement of one institution's rules as it ignores the parallel rules
of another institution, the Supreme Court has also relied upon the
description of rules or statutes termed "housekeeping" as the ex-
planation of why those rules need not be followed. Binding rules
are not "mere matters of housekeeping convenience,"Ll3 while rules
which can be broken by an agency are "simply . . . housekeeping
provision[s]."154 When a statutory revision is to be ignored, it can
be characterized as a "housekeeping change"15Ll or a "housekeeping
overhaul"156 to which no legal significance can be attached.
• 0 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981).
•, For congressional description of the places where federal courts are to be located as
"judicial housekeeping," see Judicial Housekeeping: Hearing on H.R. 408 and Related Bills
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties. and the Admin. of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1988) (opening statement of Robert W.
Kastenmeier, discussing "judicial housekeeping proposals").
•• United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 409 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("policy surrender requirement [in insurance contract] is of the order of an incidental rule
of contract ... ; indeed, it has been characterized as a housekeeping detail")•
•• American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 546 (1970) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). See also United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 760 (1979) (compliance re-
quired when "internal agency regulations do not merely facilitate internal llgency house-
keeping but rather afford significant procedural protections")•
.. Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 173 (1954) (failure to comply \\ith executive
order requiring United States Attorneys to obtain Justice Department lluthorization prior to
presenting information on tax violations to a grand jury can not be the basis for voiding II
conviction). See also Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 482 (1981) (the federal statute tbnt
obliged the Director of Federal Bureau of Prisons to certify the llvailability of lldequnte
"treatment facilities" prior to permitting state prisoners to be housed in federal prisons is
"simply a housekeeping measure" and does not require that prisoners so trnnsferred be in
need of "treatment").
.. United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 508 (1955) ("Cltcept for housekeeping chnnges
in language which are of no particular significance, ..• there has been no chnnge" in the
statute).
.. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 78 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("the 1948
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Turning from the Supreme Court to the lower federal courts to
explore the deployment of the word "housekeeping," one learns
that the lower federal courts came first-in using "housekeeping"
as a reference to other than the literal activity of maintaining one's
home or place of work-but the use of the word "housekeeping" in
that way increased greatly after the Supreme Court, members of
Congress, and others spread the usage.57 In a 1934 federal district
court opinion, an Article III trial judge stated that his first step in
a multi-party case, "in the way of housekeeping," would be to in-
struct the clerk to change a caption on a lawsuit that had named
fifty defendants to list only the names of the defendants over
whom personal jurisdiction had been secured.58 From 1934 until
the mid-1950s (when the Supreme Court picked up the term
housekeeping to refer to issues of internal organization and then to
procedural rulemaking, conflict problems, and changes in legisla-
tion), lower courts used the word "housekeeping" only occasionally
but in many of the ways that the Supreme Court eventually did. In
1945, stockmen in Montgomery Ward stores were described as
revIsion of the statute-a housekeeping overhaul intended to make no substantive
changes"). See also Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 366 (1974) (a statutory repeal
was a "housekeeping measure" that did not affect the right to jury trials).
07 As with the Supreme Court, we searched Westlaw federal data banks for cases in which
the word "housekeeping" or "house-keeping" appeared. Research thus far indicates that,
from 1789 to 1944, the lower federal courts used the word "housekeeping" in some 65 pub·
lished cases. This count is by court opinion, not by case, so that the figure may include the
same case described by more than one opinion. This number includes all Cases reported in
the Federal Reporter series. As a result, decisions of territorial courts are included. Such
courts have jurisdiction different from Article III courts and thus may increase the number
of uses of the word "housekeeping" from what it would be, were only Article III courts in
the data base. The District of Columbia courts were a part of the Federal Reporter system
until 1972, when that court system was reorganized.
As in the Supreme Court, several opinions from lower Article III judges refer to the act of
keeping house-either as relevant to domicile (see, e.g., McHaney v. Cunningham, 4 F.2d
725, 726 (W.D. La. 1925); In Te Brannock, 131 F. 819, 823 (N.D. Iowa 1904); Kemna v.
Brockhaus, 5 F. 762, 765 (Cir. Ct. Wis. 1881», or as relevant to what items are exempt assets
in bankruptcy proceedings (see, e.g., In Te Thompson, 23 F. Cas. 1021, 1022 (E.D. Mich.
1876) (No. 13,938); In Te Gregg, 10 F. Cas. 1186, 1188 (D. Me. 1868) (No. 5796». A few
twentieth-century cases discuss the magazine, Good Housekeeping. See, e.g., Clorox Chern.
Co. v. Chlorit Mfg. Corp., 25 F. Supp. 702, 704 (E.D.N.Y. 1938).
08
The caption is most misleading, and the first step in this proceeding must be.
in the way of housekeeping, to instruct the clerk of this court •.• that the
caption be changed ... and this court will not be troubled with a long list of
defendants over whom it has not personal jurisdiction.
Miller v. Van Schaick, 6 F. Supp. 633, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
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spending time "in-stockkeeping, order filling and housekeeping."1i9
In 1946, a trial judge described city maintenance, including usuch
housekeeping jobs as the washing of Fourth Avenue."llo In a 1948
district court case, reference is made to the government's interest
in "the secrecy of its housekeeping records."Ill A 1954 opinion re-
ferred to decisions to reassign a serviceman temporarily as a mat-
. ter of "Coast Guard housekeeping."1l2
Since the middle of the 1950s, the use by the lower federal
courts of the term "housekeeping"-in all four of its mean-
ings-has become so frequent that describing all of the contexts
becomes overwhelming, as well as tedious and redundant. From
1945 to 1954, the lower federal courts used the word in some 36
cases; during the next decade, the word is found in 109 cases, and
from 1965 to 1989, the word appears in some 1266 cases. A sub-
stantial number of the times in which the word appears, it is used
as an adjective-"housekeeping rule," uhousekeeping statute,"
"housekeeping matter," "housekeeping measure," and uhousekeep-
ing regulation."lls Suffice it to say that the turning point comes
with Supreme Court cases such as Hanna v. Plumer, and that, to-
day, one can find the word uhousekeeping" in a wide range of
settings.64
•• Antis v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 63 F. Supp. 669, 678 (E.D. Mich. 1945).
60 Reherd v. Manders, 66 F. Supp. 520, 526 (D. Alaska 1946) (territorial court). See also
American Transformer Co. v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 194, 201 (Ct. CL 1945) (inspectors
observed "many instances of poor 'housekeeping' near the transformers").
61 Bank Line v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 801, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See supra note 34.
See also In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280, 287 (D. D.C. 1952) (sub-
poena limited not to "include documents in the nature of housekeeping documents such ns
invoices, bills of sale, bills of lading, and routine individual sales").
62 Remaley v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 679, 680 (Ct. CL 1954).
63 We did not find these phrases in the 1945-1954 data search. Searching from 1955 to
1964, we found these phrases 18 times. From 1965 to 1989, these phrnses appear in some 292
cases. We did not weed out instances in which two of these phrnses are used in the same
case.
.. See, e.g., American Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 277,
280 (2d Cir. 1967) (potential burden on appellate courts of appealing "housekeeping mat-
ters"); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of EdUc., 380 F.2d 385, 410 (5th Cir. 1957)
(dismissing argument that federal guidelines are "interpretative regulations or 'housekeep-
ing' rules"), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1001 (1967); Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp.,
381 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1967) (evidentiary privileges are "not mere 'housekeeping' rules");
Bryan v. Kershaw, 366 F.2d 497, 503 (5th Cir. 1966) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1939) (Congress has authority to "prescribe housekeeping rules for federal
courts"», cert. denied, 386 U.S. 959 (1967); Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. United States,
331 F.2d 29, 33 (Ist Cir. 1964) (contract provision was "a mere housekeeping matter to
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In the lower courts, as in the Supreme Court, the usage often is
intended to suggest that which can be ignored (even as it is relied
upon as governing). A host of cases rely upon the term "house-
keeping" to convey that the activity in question is of lesser order
than whatever else to which that activity is compared. As one court
explained in the context of a challenge to the International Trade
Administration for failing to provide for notice and comment on a
regulation, the parties argued that "this rule has a substantial im-
pact ... and is not just a housekeeping rule."6G In the lower courts,
as in the Supreme Court, when something is characterized as
"housekeeping," that characterization may be used as justification
for applying that rule as necessary for proper administration but
not intrusive on other interests, or as justification for why the rule
or practice in question need not be followed and does not give liti-
gants enforceable rights.66
The array of items affixed to the label "housekeeping" is impres-
sive: among the items discussed as possibly within the category
permit the company to tidy up its affairs"); Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 306 F.2d 345, 355 (5th Cir. 1962) (use of separate docket numbers for gas customer
refund proceedings was "more than good procedural administrative housekeeping. It was
substantively indispensable."), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 941 (1963); Haddad v. Border Express,
Inc., 303 F.2d 134, 136 (1st Cir. 1962) (much of new information relates to "the availability
of records and other housekeeping details"); Lee v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 225 F.2d 950, 951
(D.C. Cir. 1955) (name changes were "for housekeeping purposes").
•• Interredec, Inc. v. United States, 652 F. Supp. 1550, 1556 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
•• The cases are too numerous to list. For cases involving the conflict over the application
of state or federal procedural law, see Katz v. Costa Armatori, 718 F. Supp. 1508, 1511 (S.D.
Fla. 1989) (28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) is a "federal judicial housekeeping measure" and hence is
constitutional); Sneed Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Spanier Marine Corp., 125 F.R.D. 438, 483 (E.D.
Tex. 1989) (FED. R CIV. P. 11 is "housekeeping" and thus may displace state law); Bailey v.
Chattem, Inc., 838 F. 2d 149, 152 (6th Cir. 1988) (post-judgment interest serves a "salutary
housekeeping purpose"), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988). For cases describing administra·
tive tasks as "housekeeping," see Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1479 (9th Cir.
1989) (local rulemaking power of federal courts limited to rules governing "noncontroversial
housekeeping matters," quoting 12 CHARLES WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PUACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 312, at 228 (1973»; Tripodi v. Heckler, 100 F.R.D. 736, 738 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (court docket management is "housekeeping").
For cases discussing agency "housekeeping rules," see City of Fredericksburg v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 876 F.2d 1109, 1112 (4th Cir. 1989) (agency has authority to
"relax or modify internal housekeeping regulations"); United States v. Persico, 621 F. Supp.
842, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (declining to dismiss indictments despite violation of Justice De-
partment "housekeeping rule"); Smith v. Halford, 570 F. Supp. 1187, 1191 (D. Kan. 1983)
("housekeeping" rule on transfer of prisoners not a statutory entitlement for purposes of the
due process clause).
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"housekeeping" are claims of executive privilege;67 the role of a
state agency in charge of the sale of land (it is not "only a house-
keeping agency"68); the Department of Justice policy on multiple
prosecutions of the same person for the same activity alleged to be
criminal under state and federal law (the "Petite policy has con-
sistently been held to be a mere housekeeping provision"69); F.B.I.
rules on the use of hypnosis as an investigatory aid;70 executive
orders requiring evaluations of inflationary impacts of legislation;71
and congressional power under the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments (it "is no housekeeping power"72).
One other piece of history of the use of the word "housekeeping"
is needed-to look beyond written opinions of Article ill judges.
As mentioned above, Congress has also helped to shape the legal
usage of the word "housekeeping." In addition to the hearings in
1955 on the so-called "federal housekeeping statute," Congress
held hearings in 1978 and in 1988 called "Judicial Housekeeping''13
in which testimony was taken on proposed legislation dealing with
the retirement of judges, court fees, eligibility and fees for federal
jury service, size of civil juries, transfer of incarcerated individuals,
witness fees, and the transfers of cases from district to dis-
trict-Le., matters of the organization and maintenance of the
court system. Like the Supreme Court, an array of responses exist
to the topics that are put under the umbrella of "housekeeping."
Some of these issues have sparked relatively little debate while
61 United States v. Gates, 35 F.R.D. 524, 529 (D. Colo. 1964); United States v. Procter &
Gamble, 174 F. Supp. 233, 238 (D. N.J. 1959).
68 Walker v. Felmont Oil Corp., 136 F. Supp. 584, 592 (D. Ky. 1955), vacated, 240 F.2d
912 (6th Cir. 1957).
•• United States.v. Howard, 590 F.2d 564, 567 (4th Cir. 1979) (federal and state govern-
ment may prosecute individual for same criminal behavior, if it viollltes the criminallllws of
both "sovereigns"), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979),
70 United States v. Kimberlin, 805 F.2d 210, 247 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.s.
1023 (1987).
71 Legal Aid Soc. of Alameda County v. Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319, 1329·30 n.14 (9th Cir.
1979).
7. United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 396 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 380 U.s. 145
(1965).
73 From 1935 to 1990, two sets of hearings have had that name. See infra note 124 and
accompanying text (discussing 1988 "judicial housekeeping hearings"). See also, Judicial
Housekeeping: Hearings on H.R. 408 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judicia')', 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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others (such as the size of the jury) have been the subject of heated
dispute.74
Finally, dictionaries document some of the change in use of the
word "housekeeping." A history of the general usage of "house-
keeping" merits ali essay unto itself; I will provide only a cursory
glimpse of speakers other than lawyers and judges. According to an
1856 dictionary,7li the first definition of housekeeping is "the fam-
ily state" and a "housekeeper" is "one who occupies a house"; the
second definition of housekeeping is "domestic," and the second
definition of a housekeeper is "a female who superintends domestic
concerns."76 Thus, for more than a century, dictionaries in the
United States have shared historians' identification of the house as
the domain of women, and with it, the creation of "separate
spheres" for women and men that in turn has provided a basis for
the idealization of "domesticity."77
One hundred years later, in the 1960s, Webster's Seventh New
Collegiate Dictionary had added a definition for housekeeping. In
addition to being "the management of a house and home affairs,"
housekeeping also occurred outside the home, as "the care and
management of property and the provision of equipment and ser-
vices (as for an industrial organization)."18 By 1989, the Oxford
English Dictionary offered yet another usage: "those operations of
a computer, organization, etc. which make its work possible but do
not directly constitute its performance."79
74 See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (upholding the use of the six-member
jury in criminal cases); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (six-member jury in federal
civil litigation); see also Hans Zeisel & Shari Diamond, Convincing Empirical Evidence on
The Six Member Jury, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 281-82 (1974) (in Williams and Colgrove the
Supreme Court "was misled in believing" that the size of the jury had no effect on the
outcome). Compare with Edward J. Devitt's position, when as Chief Judge of the U.s. Dis·
trict Court in Minnesota he was enthusiastic about changing the size of civil juries. Sce
Devitt, The Six Man Jury in The Federal Court, 53 F.R.D. 273 (1971).
7G WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 165 (1856).
,. Id. See also WEBSTER'S ACADEMIC DICTIONARY 276 (1895); THE CENTURY DICTIONAIIY: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIC LEXICON OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2902-03 (William Dwight Whitney ed.
1889). THE CENTURY DICTIONARY has the same primary and secondary meaning and includes
a quotation from Charles Dickens' BLEAK HOUSE in which reference is made to "the hand-
some old face and fine responsible portly figure of the housekeeper." Id. (citing BLEAK
HOUSE ch. xviii).
17 See supra note 24.
1. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 403 (1963).
,. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY. VOL. VII 444 (1989). See also WEBSTEII'S 1973 NEW COL-
LEGIATE DICTIONARY 554 (the third definition is: "the routine tasks that have to be done in
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B. Understanding the Import of the Label
Over the life of the federal judiciary, its usage of the word
"housekeeping" has changed. Initially used to mean the actual ac-
tivity of maintaining a home, "housekeeping" came to refer to the
maintenance and sanitation of businesses, public places, and work-
places as well as a home. Thereafter, the usage broadened from the
work of maintenance in the material sense to the more abstract
notion, that rules by which institutions were run were "housekeep-
ing"; as a consequence, some of the internal affairs of contracts,
courts, administrative agencies, and businesses were denoted
"housekeeping." Most recently, "housekeeping" has embraced (but
is not always equated with) a series of other concepts: that the ac-
tivity so described is itself an activity of lesser order than the ac-
tivity to which it is compared, that the "housekeeping" activity is
not one of "substance," that the activity is unimportant, or that
the activity merits little discussion or attention. The four senses of
the word interrelate with the three grammatical structures that
routinely occur when it is used. Sometimes, there is a straight at-
tribution: a certain act is "housekeeping." Sometimes, there is a
dismissive and distancing negation: a certain act is or is not merely
"housekeeping." Sometimes, "housekeeping" is cast in oppositional
terms-"housekeeping" is not "historymaking"; "housekeeping
rules" are not "substantive rights."
The deployment of "housekeeping" is a complex act, the depth
of which cannot be fully explored here. But one context is worth
underscoring. "Housekeeping" is often used as a means of trivial-
izing and silencing when a court compares two domains or institu-
tions, each of which has rules: agencies and courts, federal and
state courts, appellate and trial courts. A judge names one institu-
tion's rule or practice as secondary as compared to another's.
Sometimes, with the description "housekeeping" comes permission
to ignore a rule or practice; sometimes that description permits a
court to enforce such a rule. Thus, the label "housekeeping" may
order for a system to function"). I have been tracing the use of the word in the federal
courts; popular culture's more important sources are computer magazines. For example, the
OXFORD 'ENGLISH DICTIONARY VOL. VII quotes as follows: "1956 J. Assoc. Computing Ma-
chinery III. 269 Most of the errors ... turned up in the logical or housekeeping operations ••
. . 1958 Gotlieb & Hume, High Speed Data Processing, v.SO. In programming a problem for
a data-processing machine many of the instructions ... fall into a class called organizational
or housekeeping instructions ...." ld. at 444.
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be a source of power and occasionally the basis for respecting pre..
rogatives. "Housekeeping" is not, however, often a source of pride.
When Article III judges use "housekeeping" in this fourth way,
they do so by relating and locating a given claim within a hierarchy
of activities, rules, or institutions. The ability to so locate "house-
keeping" comes in part from changes in the courts. For example,
the statute that authorized the promulgation in 1938 of the nation..
wide Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-coupled with doctrinal
changes about when to apply state law in diversity cases litigated
in federal court-prompted the development of law that depended
upon classifying state and federal rules as of one nature or another
("substance" or "procedure"). The emergence of this use of
"housekeeping" comes also in the context of courts and agencies
developing rules for their own management and describing their
own practices. The emergence of this usage also depends upon the
identification of the literal work of keeping
homes-"housekeeping"-as work that is done by women. Part of
the reason why one can so readily read "housekeeping" to mean
something of secondary importance is that housekeeping has a gen..
der-that gender is female, and it is we (women) who are the "sec..
ond sex."80
Given this potential for understanding "housekeeping" as an ac..
tivity of lesser import, the labeling of rules or issues as "house-
keeping" may reflect a shared cultural sense of the value of a par..
ticular activity or it may be an effort to transform that activity
into one to which attention should not be paid. Take, for example,
the deployment of the label "housekeeping" by members of the
Supreme Court. In one case, pretrial detainees and convicted mis..
demeanants successfully challenged-as a denial of equal protec..
tion-a state's refusal to enable them to obtain absentee ballots.81
The dissenters protested: this ruling "unwisely elevat[ed] and pro..
ject[ed] constitutional pronouncements onto an area-and into
distant and obscure corners of that area-that . . . should be a
8. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR. THE SECOND SEX (1953). Housekeeping is not only relegated to
women, it is often relegated by women of one race or class to women of another raco and
lower class. See, e.g., JUDITH ROLLINS, BETWEEN WOMEN: DOMESTICS AND THEIR EMPLOYEIlS
21-59 (1985) (history of "domestic service").
81 O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974). Under state law, those jailed were not pro·
cluded from voting.
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. L. Rev. 931 1989-1990
1990] FEDERAL TRIAL COURTS 931
domain reserved for the State's own housekeeping."82 Federal
courts, the argument went, should not look at such claims, which
were "minor and collateral and not of great, let alone constitu-
tional, import."83 In another case, in which the majority decided
that the trial court was not required to release the Nixon tapes to
the media before criminal appeals on Watergate had concluded, a
dissenter complained that the Supreme Court was intruding on the
district court's "own housekeeping practices"84-and thus should
not intervene.
Given the deployment of the word "housekeeping" in the four
contexts that I have sketched, I would like the word "housekeep-
ing" to be seen by the reader as a signal to begin a series of ques-
tions: What is the claim of value being made here? Where did that
valuation come from? Do I share that appraisal? Do I want to re-
ject the use of the word "housekeeping," or do I want to alter the
import that such labeling has? These questions parallel those
raised by contemporary historians who have come to question the
dichotomy drawn between "historymaking" and "housekeeping"8l>
and to dispute the idea that daily activities of women and men are
not the stuff of "history."88 Indeed an entire field of historical re-
search is devoted to recovery of the history of those who were not
"statesmen" but whose lives and views shaped their countries'
cultures.87
.2 414 U.S. 524, 535 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.).
83 I d. at 536.
S< Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 615 (1978) (Ste\'ens, J.,
dissenting).
•• Recall the words of the witness in the 1955 hearings on the federal "housekeeping"
statute: "[the statute] was not a historymaking bill.... It was just a housekeeping statute,
and as such raised none of the great issues that would have aroused Madison, Jefferson,
Mason and the rest of the statesmen." Statement of J. Russell Wiggins, supra note 36.
• 6 See, e.g., 4 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE: FROM THE FIRES OF REVOLUTION TO TIlE GREAT
WAR (Michelle Perrot ed., Arthur Goldhammer trans. 1990); Judith Allen, Evidence and
Silence: Feminism and the Limits of History in FEMINIST CHALLENGES: SOCIAL AND POUTI-
CAL THEORY (Carole Patemen & Elizabeth Gross eds. 1986) [hereinafter FEMINIST CHAL-
LENGES: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY]; What is Women's History?, 35 HIST. Too,,," 38
(1985) (commentaries by Olwen Hufton, James F. McMillan, Natalie Ztlmon Davis, Sall}'
Humphreys, Angela V. John, Linda Gordon, Jane Rendall, Anna Davin)•
.., See, e.g., Francois Furet, Beyond the Annales, 55 J. MOD. HIST. 389 (1983); Matthew
Ramsey, Review Essay: History of a Profession, Annales Stj'le: The Work of Jacques Leo-
nard, 17 J. Soc. HIST. 319 (1983). While congenial in many respects to feminist concerns,
this approach is not intrinsically feminist. See Susan Mosher Stuard, The Annales School
and Feminist History: Opening Dialogue with the American Stepchild, 7 SIGNS 135 (981).
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The witness who argued before Congress in 1955 that govern-
ment recordkeeping was merely "housekeeping" (and therefore not
of interest to the "greats" like Thomas Jefferson) was wrong on the
facts as well as on the interpretation of those facts. It is not only
that "housekeeping" is a part of "history," it is also that the "great
men" of "history" have used strategies of trivialization to attempt
to obscure exercises of power. Thomas Jefferson cared a good deal
about government papers and their use, as documented by his ef-
forts to protect his records from disclosure during the trial of
Aaron Burr. Jefferson argued that the government had two kinds
of activities: on the "public side" was its work on "grants of land,
patents for inventions, certain commissions, proclamations, &
other papers patent in their nature. To the other [private side] be-
long mere executive proceedings."ss That quote from Jefferson's
letter, written in response to requests for documents by the United
. States Attorney for the District of Virginia in the Aaron Burr trea-
son trial,s9 resulted in one of the famous "historical" conflicts be-
tween John Marshall and Thomas Jefferson.9o In the twentieth
century, when discussing executive privilege, Wigmore's treatise on
evidence referred to the Jefferson letter, and Wigmore's reference
was in turn relied upon in 1948 by then District Judge Simon
Rifkin, describing the federal government's effort to quash a sub-
poena because of the need to undertake a "housekeeping investiga-
tion" in private.91 One can thus trace Jefferson's "private"f"pub-
lie" distinction to the contemporary label "housekeeping" and to
the debates about internal affairs of government, the maintenance
of records, and access to those records.92 From this lineage comes
another opportunity to question whether such "housekeeping"
88 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay, U.S. Attorney for Dist. of Va. (Juno 17,
1807), reprinted in 10 WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 401 (Paul Leicister Ford ed. 1905).
89 According to Raoul Berger and Abe Krash, Jefferson "produced all the documents do-
manded except one." Raoul Berger & Abe Krash, supra note 34, at 1457.
90 [d. at 1456-60.
•, The Wigmore reference to this letter is cited in Bank Line, Ltd. v. United States, 76 F.
Supp. 801, 803 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). Wigmore quotes Jefferson as stating that, "[w]ith reo
spect to papers, there is certainly a public and a private side to our offices." 8 JOliN WlO·
MORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2379, at 799·800 (3rd ed. 1940)•
• 2 Ct. Paul Hardin, III, Executive Privilege in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 879
(1962); Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., Constitutional Law: The People's Right to Know, 45
ABA J. 667 (July 1959) (the revision of the "so·called federal 'housekeeping' statuto"-that
clarified it did not provide executive permission to withhold information-"laid to rest an
insidious secrecy practice").
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should be equated with the less important tasks to which less at-
tention need be paid-as well as a host of questions about the pub-
lic/private distinction that a discussion of "housekeeping" necessa-
rily invokes.93
Often deployed to be trivializing, "housekeeping" includes under
its rubric a range of matters, the nature of which is deeply con-
tested. Thus, the study of the term "housekeeping" returns con-
stantly to the questions of what value is attributed to the activity
,so described. That inquiry, in turn, takes me to the allocation of
work in the federal trial courts.
III. HIERARCHIES OF JUDGES AND OF JUDICIAL WORK
In the eighteenth century, during the first years of the federal
court system, two sets of Article III judges worked at the task of
adjudication. Supreme Court Justices manned the highest court;
they sat together with lower court judges on the "circuit courts,"
which had both original and appellate jurisdiction,9~ and lower
court judges sat alone on the "district courts."9G Two hundred
years later, many more people bear the title "judge," and role de-
lineations have occurred among Supreme Court Justices, other ap-
pellate judges, Article III trial judges, bankruptcy judges, and mag-
istrates.96 The lines between appellate and trial judges have
clarified, as common-law doctrines delineate the role of the judges
who review work of the trial level court.97 However, the respective
•• As does the history of the word "economics" which is often assumed to relate to the
"public"/market activities but which has etymological origins linking it to "the management
of a household." See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 58 (2d cd. 1989)•
.. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, 1st Cong.•
1st Sess., ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73,73-75, 78-79.
• 0 Id. at 73-74. A third group of judges-"territorial judges"-emerged by virtue of Con-
gressional governance of the District of Columbia and acquisition of "territories." See Amer-
ican Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (l Cranch)
137 (1803). For discussion of territorial courts, see Gary Lawson, Territorial Gocernments
and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CALIF. L. REv. (forthcoming 1990)•
.. A slight overstatement, in that occasionally, "by designation," a judge/justice from one
level court may sit on another. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 291(b) (l988) (circuit judges designated
to district courts); 28 U.S.C. § 292 (1988) (district judges designated to sit on appellate
courts). Moreover, in a few instances, appellate courts have "original," rather than appel-
late, jurisdiction. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1988) (NLRB to petition court of appeals "for
the enforcement of' an order); 28 U.S.C. § 2321(a) (l988) ("proceeding to enjoin or suspend
•.. a rule, regulation, or order of the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be brought in
the court of appeals").
•• See, e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (l990) (appellate courts can
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. L. Rev. 934 1989-1990
934 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:909
roles of the three sets of judges who sit at the trial level are not so
clear.
Article III trial judges, magistrates, and bankruptcy judges all
have responsibility for pretrial management of cases, for factfind·
ing in certain instances, and for writing opinions under some cir·
cumstances. Some of what each set of judges does can be "final" if
the time for review expires without challenge by a litigant ad·
versely affected.98 The question that has emerged, with greater fre·
quency over the past few years, is the extent to which there exists
a preserve of trial level activities over which Article III judges have
exclusive dominion. The question comes in different forms. One
version, arising in case law, asks what authority Congress has given
by statute to magistrates and to bankruptcy judges and whether
such statutes are constitutional. Can magistrates conduct voir
dire?99 Can bankruptcy judges hold jury trials?100 Must Article III
only reverse Rule 11 decisions upon a finding of abuse of discretion); Anderson v. Bessemer
City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) (the meaning of "clear error"). But see Clemons v. Mississippi, 110
S. Ct. 1441 (1990) (exemplifying the confusion between jury decisionmaking and appellate
review).
98 For example, certain pretrial decisions made by magistrates-excluding injunctions,
summary judgments, and other dispositive decisions-are reviewed if challenged under the
standard of whether a magistrate's order is "clearly erroneous" or "contrary to law," 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1988). When magistrates conduct hearings and submit proposed find·
ings of fact and recommendations, a judge must make a "de novo determination" of those
portions of the report to which objection is made within the ten day period. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(C) (1988). In practice, "[t]he judge may officially be the final decision maker, but
magistrates usually undertake the close review of the briefs and arguments and then make
the important determinations." CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, SUBORDINATE JUDGES, supra note 8,
at 151-52.
When a bankruptcy judge submits proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law after a
hearing on a matter that is not a "core" proceeding, the district judge reviews "de novo
those matters to which any party has timely and specifically objected," before entering a
final order or judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1988). In core proceedings, "[t]he district
courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments,
orders, and decrees ... of bankruptcy judges." 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988). In lieu of district
judges, bankruptcy appellate panels may also hear appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1988).
99 This question arises in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Gomez v. United States, 109 S.
Ct. 2237 (1989) (voir dire is not an "additional" statutory "duty" given by Congress to mag·
istrates; constitutional question of whether Congress can give such authority to magistrates
not decided); United States v. France, 886 F.2d 223, 228 (9th Cir. 1989) (Gomez applies
retroactively to all cases that were not final when it was decided; France's failure to object
to magistrate selection of the jury was not a waiver because a "solid wall of circuit author-
ity" made such a challenge at the time futile), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 2203 (1990)j United
States v. Musacchia, 900 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1990) (precluding a challenge when the magis.
trate conducted voir dire and the defendant remained silent); United States v. Martinez·
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judges hear witnesses already heard by magistrates when those de-
cisions are challenged?lOl Can litigants consent to civil trials con-
ducted by magistrates?102 Another version of the question builds
upon legal interpretations to argue, as a matter of policy, that Arti-
cle I judges should be assigned certain tasks, Article III judges
other tasks.
Yet a third way to think about this issue is to return to "house-
keeping." The divisions drawn between Article III and Article I
judges bear some resemblance to the linguistic deployment of
housekeeping, with its distancing, dismissive, and oppositional
structures. The category "housekeeping" underscores questions
about the divisions drawn between Article I and Article III judges.
Are some kinds of adjudicatory work considered "housekeeping"
(either in the sense of being work to which less attention need be
paid or work of les,s importance) and given to lower echelon
judges? Should certain kinds of work be segregated and left to a
particular set of judges? These questions (although not oft~n ex-
pressed in "housekeeping" terms103) are very much the questions
Torres, 912 F.2d 1552 (1st Cir. 1990) (following United States v. France; Gomez applies
even though defendant made no objection to jury selection by magistrate); Virgin Islands v.
Williams, 892 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1989) (defendant's failure to object to federal magistrate
conducting voir dire precludes challenge); United States v. Wey, 895 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. I
1990) (objection waived when defendant's lawyer agreed to magistrate selection of jury); In
re United States (United States v. Sayeedi), 903 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1990) (precluding magis-
trate from presiding when government objected and despite defendant's willingness to per-
mit a magistrate to preside at jury selection); Olympia Hotels Corp. v. Johnson Wax Dev.
Corp., 908 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1990) (magistrate lacks authority to conduct civil voir dire).
See also United States v. Sawyers, 902 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1990) (upholding magistrate's
power to give an Allen charge; relying on the Gomez decision and the defendant's silence).
100 In re Ben Cooper, Inc., 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 3269
(1990); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782 (1989).
101 United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675 (1980). In Raddatz, the Court held that an
Article ill judge was not required "to actually conduct a new hearing" when accepting mag-
istrate's decision (that relied upon evaluations of witnesses' credibility) to suppress evi-
dence; it was "unlikely" that Article III trial judge could "reject a magistrate's proposed
findings on credibility when those findings are dispositive" without rehearing \·.itnesses. Id.
at 681 n.7 (emphasis in original).
10' Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc., v. Istromedex, Inc., 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir.
1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984); Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc.,
742 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1984). See also Colorado Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council v. Ander-
sen Constr. Co., 879 F.2d 809 (10th Cir. 1990) (absent parties' consent and delegation by
district judge, magistrate lacks power to enter post-judgment final order).
lOS But occassionally are. See infra note 124 and accompanying text (reference to Judicial
Housekeeping: Hearing on H.R. 408 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judicial)', 100th
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asked as courts and commentators have discussed "the federal
courts" over the past two decades. Starting in this century, concern
about increasing filings in the federal courts prompted commenta-
tors to assess the scope of federal jurisdiction and to propose alter-
ations.104 This is not the place to chronicle all of the proposals
made; rather, I will highlight recent discussion that focuses on
which federal trial judges do what tasks in which categories of
cases arising under federal law.
A. Contemporary Aspirations for the Article III Judiciary
Much of the contemporary conversation about federal court ju-
risdiction is focused upon the number of cases filed in the federal
system. The dockets of both trial and appellate courts have grown
dramatically during this century; growing caseloads in turn bring
attention to the capacity of the federal judiciary to respond. lOG A
good deal of commentary is couched in terms of concern that the
Article III judiciary, while currently "small," is in danger of be-
coming "too large" and, therefore, that some work reassignments
are required. (The conception of the "size" of the federal courts is
itself an intriguing one. What aspects of a court system make it
"small" or "large"-the number of cases pending? the number of
judges and other employees? the number of courthouses and the
amount of physical space? the number of reported decisions? the
size of its budget? While all of these are possible measures, the
discussion of the "size" of the federal judiciary is dominated by the
number of Article III judges that it has.)
As of 1988, the Article III courts had 168 authorized appellate
judgeships and 575 authorized trial judgeships.106 By way of com-
parison, 769 state court judges sit on intermediate appellate courts;
some 6204 state court judges sit on courts that have appellate and
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988».
104 See: e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES LANDIS. THE BUSINESS OF TilE SUPREME COUIIT:
A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1928).
10. See TERENCE DUNGWORTH & NICHOLAS M. PACE, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LITI·
GATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1990) vi-vii (caseload growth); viii (despite growth in filings
of civil cases by "private" parties, the "average time to disposition for private civil cases Was
about the same in 1986 as it was in 1971"); viii-ix (the percentage of cases terminated with·
out any reported court action remained relatively constant at 40% in 1986 as compared to
1971, yet the rate of cases tried as a percentage of termination declined).
10. 1989 ADMIN. OFFICE REPORT, supra note 7, at 46.
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. L. Rev. 937 1989-1990
1990] FEDERAL TRIAL COURTS 937
original jurisdiction,107 while another 12,929 state court judges are
purely trial judges.lOB The characterization of the Article ill judici-
ary as "small" could depend upon comparison between the com-
bined size of the state judiciaries (l9,902)-responding to the adju-
dicative needs in the United States-with the size of the Article ill
judiciary (of some 743 judges, or 3.5% of the combined federal-
state judicial population). Under that framework, Article ill judges
who are concerned about the "size" of their judiciary would be as-
sured of their status in a very "small" ("minuscule" might be a
better description) judiciary and as likely to remain so-absent
phenomenal increases in their ranks by legislation that would have
to come (currently) from a Democratic Congress and that would
enable a Republican President to appoint hundreds of judges.l09
Thus, one possible response to contemporary concern about the
increased number of cases pending in the federal courts is to in-
crease the number of judges to preside over those cases. Many
commentators, however, counsel against expansion of Article ill
courts.no Over the past decade, they have repeated a set of argu-
ments about the number of Article ill judges and the nature of
their work. For example, in the mid-1970s, when he was Solicitor
General, Eobert Bork argued that the Article ill judiciary needed
to be kept "small." As he explained:
Large numbers dilute prestige, a major attraction of a ca-
reer on the bench, and make it harder to recruit first-rate
lawyers. Large numbers damage collegiality, lessen esprit,
and diminish the possibility of interaction throughout
the judicial corps.lll
107 NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 1987 at 20-71
(1988). These figures are derived by reviewing data listed state by state.
108 Id. This figure is derived by compiling the number of judgeships listed for courts de-
scribed as having only original jurisdiction in each of the states.
109 Currently pending before Congress is a bill, the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, S.
2648, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (the "Biden Bill"), that provides for case management
and the creation of 77 new judgeships (in the Senate ·,ersion).
110 See generally, Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Roie of the Federal
Courts, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 67, 69-74.
III Robert Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R-D. 231, 234
(address delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction \\ith
the Administration of Justice, The Pound Conference, held in St. Paul, Minnesota, Apr. 7-9,
1976). See also DEPT. OF JUSTICE COMht ON REVISION OF THE FED. JUDICIAL SYSTEM, THE
NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 6-7 (1977) (committee chaired by Robert Bork and whose
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In lieu of expanding the number of judges, Bork suggested con-
tracting the reach of Article III jurisdiction. In addition to sug-
gesting the abolition of diversity, Bork argued that cases involving
social security, food stamps, federal employers' liability, consumer
products, and some aspects of the Clean Air Act should be sent
away from Article III judges. l12 In his words, welfare "programs
may have great social importance but the issues presented are in
large measure legal trivia."l13 Just as some courts have dismissed
activities as "housekeeping," Bork dismissed the work of ruling on
claims arising from these statutes. In Bork's view, these cases can
be decided by "someone far less qualified than a judge."114
Although the terms are somewhat different, the rhetoric less
blunt, and the analysis far more complete, Richard Posner has
reached many conclusions similar to those of Robert Bork about
appropriate responses to the perceived federal court overload. For
example, in his book, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform,11G
Posner also urged that more of the adjudication of social security
cases be moved to agencies,116 that federal employer liability
claims be sent to ad~inistrative decisionmakers, and that the
members included Scott Crampton, Ronald Gainer, Thomas Kauper, Rex Lee, Stanley Pot·
tinger, Antonin Scalia, Peter Taft, Richard Thornburgh, and Michael Uhlmann, concluded
that
[s]welling the size of the federal judiciary indefinitely would damage collegial.
ity, an essential element in the collective evolution of sound legal principles,
and diminish the possibility of personal interaction throughout the judiciary.••
. Large numbers dilute the great prestige ... and, given the low compensation
that we provide for federal judges, that dilution will make it increasingly more
difficult to attract first-rate men and women.)
(on file with author) [hereinafter THE NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS].
112 At the time, Bork described his efforts as an "embryonic project." Robert Bork, supra
note 111, at 23l.
113 [d. at 237. See also THE NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 111, at 8·9 (Article
III adjudication not needed for "relatively unsophisticated, repetitious factual issues••••
[R]epetitious factual disputes [that] rarely give rise to important legal questions [include]
claims arising under the Social Security Act, the Federal Employers Liability Act, the Con'
sumer Products Safety Act, and the Truth-in-Lending Act.")
II. Robert Bork, supra note 111, at 238-39. Bork also thought that many of these casos
could be "handled informally, without counsel, unless the claimant desired an attorney••••
[While] [s)ome cases might require rigorous procedural and evidentiary rules as well as the
assistance of counsel, ... that degree of rigor could perhaps be dispensed with, for examplo,
in the ordinary Social Security disability case." [d. at 239.
m RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985).
". [d. at 160-61 (in "the case of social security disability benefits, maybe it [Article III
appellate review) could be eliminated altogether").
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. L. Rev. 939 1989-1990
1990] FEDERAL TRIAL COURTS 939
numbers of Article III judges should not be greatly increased.ll7
Justice Antonin Scalia has also commented on cases appropriate
for Article ill adjudication. Recently, Justice Scalia reminisced
about his vision, when he was graduating from law school in 1960,
of the federal judiciary.
The federal courts, as I knew them then, were forums for
the "big case"-major commercial litigation under the di-
versity jurisdiction, and federal actions under such laws
regulating interstate commerce as the Sherman Act, the
Securities Exchange Act, and the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. They [the Article III courts] were not the place
where one would find many routine tort and employment
disputes. They had FELA [Federal Employer Liability
Act] and Jones Act cases, to be sure-but those seemed
to be the exception proving the rule, a touch of the mun-
dane in a docket that was at least substantially ex-
otic. . . . In short, there was, in 1960, real meaning to
the phrase "Don't make a federal case out of it."118
Substantial divergences exist between Justice Scalia's memories
about what he (as a third-year law student) thought was in the
federal courts and what actually was in the federal courts. Marc
Galanter has responded in detail in an article about "The Federal
Courts Since the Good Old Days."u9 While Justice Scalia correctly
noted that case filings have increased dramatically (civil filings
rose from 51,063 cases in 1960 to 254,249 cases in 1986) and that
both tort and contract cases contributed to that increase,120 Justice
Scalia erred in describing tort cases in 1960 as "the exception ... ,
a touch of the mundane." In fact, torts were the largest category of
Il7 Id. at 95-102, 129. See also Richard Posner, Coping with the Caseload: A Comment on
Magistrates and Masters, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2216 (1989) ("The federal courts were
created to be small. . . . The natural limits of expansion were not reached until very
recently.").
118 Address by Justice Antonin Scalia to the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation and
the National Conference of Bar Presidents (Feb. 15, 1987), reprinted in 34 FED. B. NEWS &
J. 252 (1987).
119 Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; or, The Federal Courts Since the
Good Old Days, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 921-
120 Id. at 924. According to Galanter, "six categories of cases account for over four-fifths
of the increase[-]civil rights cases, prisoner petitions, social security cases, recovery cases,
other contract cases, and tort cases." Id.
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kind of case in the federal civil docket in 1960-making up 38% of
the filings then, as· compared to the 17% of the filings that they
constituted in 1986.121
The central question, however, is not whether Justice Scalia's
rosy reminiscence is clouded. Whatever the caseload, 1960 or 1990,
the question is: what does one wish for "the federal courts"? The
answer from the commentary of Robert Bork, Richard Posner, and
Antonin Scalia seems to be that the Article III judiciary must be
small in number and do "important" work, and that important
work is by definition not the work of adjudicating "routine" tort
cases, not the work of deciding individual cases challenging govern-
ment decisions under certain federal regulatory statutes. The
sense, stated most bluntly by Robert Bork, is that those cases are
somehow beneath the dignity of the Article III judiciary. Recall
Bork's phrase: "someone less qualified than a judge" can decide
claims of wrongfully withheld social security benefits.
The themes of specialness and smallness as hallmarks of Article
III judges were reiterated in a recent report written by a congres-
sionally chartered group, "the Federal Courts Study Committee"122
(FCSC), whose task was to "examine problems and issues currently
facing the courts of the United States," to "develop a long-range
plan for the future of the Federal judiciary," and to report, some
fifteen months later, to Congress and others about how to imple-
ment the proposals.123 When Congress debated legislation to au-
121 Id. at 927. The kind of tort cases filed has changed: in 1960, 55.6% of the tort diversity
filings were motor vehicle personal injury cases; in 1986, car cases were 23.1 % of the diver·
sity tort total. Id. at 937. In contrast, product liability filings have increased, from 10.2% of
tort filings in 1975 to 31.5% in 1985. Id. Further, as Galanter explains, in 1960, as today,
many commentators reported a "crisis in the courts." Id. at 927.
122 Federal Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 102(a) (1988) (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 331 note).
123 Id. at § 102(b). As provided by the legislation, the Chief Justice of the United States
appointed 15 individuals to the Study Committee. Chaired by the Honorable Joseph Weis of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the membership included Judge
Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit, Judge Jose Cabranes of the Federal District Court in
Connecticut, Judge Levin Campbell of the First Circuit, Robert Kastenmeier, of the House
of Representatives' Judiciary Committee, and former Solicitor General, Rex Lee, now presi.
dent of Brigham Young University. Judges Posner, Cabranes, and Campbell all chaired sub·
committees of the FCSC. Other committee members included J. Vincent Aprile, Esq. (Gen-
eral Counsel, Kentucky State Dept. of Public Advocacy); Chief Justice Keith M. Callow (of
the Washington Supreme Court); Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Esq. (Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice); Senator Charles E. Grassley (Iowa;
member, U.s. Senate Judiciary Committee); Morris Harrell, Esq. (former president of the
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thorize such a study, the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee held hearings-called "Judicial Housekeeping."12" Thus, once
again, the complex deployment of the word "housekeeping"-this
time to reassure courtwatchers that no "political" agendas were to
be advanced by the creation of a study committee. As the Federal
Courts Study Committee itself later explained the mandate, it was
to avoid "substantive concerns" and instead direct itself to "insti-
tutional arrangements."12~
In many ways, this "housekeeping" work is a stunning achieve-
ment. Fifteen people together for under fifteen months-writing a
book about a vast number of topics, all related to federal courts.
As the press release for the FCSC Report describes: "A blue-rib-
bon panel of members of Congress, judges, and lawyers . . . has
proposed over one hundred changes in the administration and op-
eration of the federal court system."126 As a collaborative effort,
the Report is not animated by a single set of theoretical assump-
tions, and for this discussion, only one aspect of the Report's work
American Bar Association and member of a Dallas, Texas law firm); Senator Howell Heflin
(Alabama; member, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee); Judge Judith N. Keep (U.S. District
Judge, S.D. California); Representative Carlos J. Moorhead (California; member, U.S. House
of Representatives Judiciary Committee); Diana Gribbon Motz, Esq. (member of Baltimore,
Maryland law firm). FCSC REPORT, supra note 12, at iii. The Federal Courts Study Com-
mittee divided into subgroups, and those subgroups in turn convened advisory groups to
consider questions of 'workload, division of responsibility between state and federal courts,
federal courts and agencies, and the like. I served on the advisory panel to the subcommit-
tee (on the role and relationships of federal courts to other branches of government and
judicial entities) that was chaired by Richard Posner.
124 See Judicial Housekeeping: Hearings on H.R. 408 and Related Bills Before the SulJ.
comm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). These hearings included H.R. 1929, a bill to estab-
lish a Federal Courts Study Commission, and H.R. 3227, a bill to establish a Federal Courts
Study Commission on Judicial Administration.ld. at 12-29. For the related Senate hearings,
see Federal Courts Study Act: Hearings on S. 951 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Admin. Practice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
12' FCSC REPORT, supra note 12, at 3. The Study Committee issued a Tentative Report in
December of 1989. See generally FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, TEI',TAn\'E RECOM-
MENDAnONS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT (Dec. 22, 1989) (on file with author) [hereinafter FCSC
TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS}. During January, hearings were held in nine cities around the
country on the report. Some 270 witnesses (myself included) testified. Revisions were then
made, and, on April 2, 1990, the Committee filed its final report.
128 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY Cor-n.1., NEWS RELEAsE 1 (April 2, 1990) (on file \\ith author).
In addition, the project sparked a vast research effort. See Federal Courts Sj'mposium, 1990
B.Y.u. L. REv. 1; FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMr-1., WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMM. REPORTS
(July 1, 1990) [hereinafter FCSC WORKING PAPERS}.
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is relevant: its assessment of the allocation of work between Article
III judges and non-Article III federal adjudicators.
The FCSC Report began by emphasizing the specialness of the
Article III judiciary: "the federal judiciary is composed most im·
portantly of Article III judges."127 The Report (echoing the com-
ments of Robert Bork and Richard Posner) argued that the Article
III judiciary had to be very small. Specifically, the FCSC Report
cited the suggestion that "1,000 [judges] is the practical ceiling"
for the federal judiciary; the Report observed that "we may be ap·
proaching the limits of the natural growth of the federal courts."128
In some respects, the Report suggests that smallness itself is the
quality central, almost definitional, to the Article III judiciary.
What assumptions underlie this view? One aspect of the argument
relies on description: Article III judges are special because they are
few in numbers; because there are few Article III judges, they are
special. But there is more than circularity, for the argument in·
cludes the claim that the process by which Article III judges are
selected-presidential nomination and senate confirmation-is
currently successful but depends upon the executive and legislative
branches having a relatively small number of candidates, and that
persons so nominated are subjected to relatively extensive and
somewhat public scrutiny by the American Bar Association and
the Department of Justice. (The implicit assumption is that either
because of other constraints upon magistrates and bankruptcy
judges or because of the work that these judges do, the executive
and legislative branches need not pay such attention to them.120)
In addition, the Report assumes that highly qualified lawyers who
are willing to be considered for the Article III judiciary are only so
willing because they know that very few other people can hold that
127 FCSC REPORT, supra note 12, at 69.
12. ld. at 8. These views match those of Richard Posner, Coping with the Caseload: A
Comment on Magistrates and Masters, supra note 117.
12. For a description of the demographics of those selected by Article III trial judges to be
magistrates, see Christopher E. Smith, Who are the U.S. Magistrates? 71 JUDlCATUItE 143
(1987). According to the Committee on the Administration of the Magistrates System of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, Article III trial judges should continue to have
appointment power for magistrates; it "is essential to leave appointment authority with the
district judges, whose enlightened self-interest should prompt them to select candidates of
the highest caliber." Report of the Committee on the Administration of the Federal Magis<
trates System of the Federal Courts Study Committee at 5, collected in FCSC WORKING
PAPERS, supra note 126, Vol. 2, Section IV.
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position and thus, if selected, that they will be relatively visible
and prestigious actors.130 In the words of the Report:
a judge who felt like simply a tiny cog in a vast wheel
that would turn at the same speed whatever the judge
did would not approach the judicial task with the requi-
site sense that power must be exercised respon-
sibly-especially when that judge, by reason of having
life tenure, lacked the usual incentives to perform as-
signed tasks energetically and responsibly.l3l
To keep the Article m judiciary small, the FCSC Report pro-
posed reallocating some of the work, currently formally assigned to
the Article III judiciary, to other institutions.132 The suggestions of
most relevance to this discussion relate to the allocation of author-
ity between Article III and Article I judges. The Report proposed
that, in a variety of civil federal statutory schemes, more of the
first-line adjudicatory work-factfinding and sometimes the first
level of appellate review-be shifted away from Article m judges
to others.133 For example, building on earlier proposals to exclude
130 See FCSC REPORT, supra note 12, at 7. Another aspect (relevant in part to statel
federal relations) of the argument for a "small" Article III judicinry comes from a view that
federal authority is itself supposed to be limited, and thus federal courts should be limited
in size; on the occasions when federal judicial intervention occurs, it "is more likely" to be
"acceptable" to the public if "the federal judiciary is perceived as a small and special corps •
. . rather than as a faceless, omnipresent bureaucracy." ld. at 8.
131 ld. at 7. In the December 22nd Tentative Report, the explanations about u·lIy the
Article III judiciary should stay small centered around concern that expansion would result
in "unqualified candidates," diminish "collegiality," "accountability," and "job satisfaction,"
and result in increased legal uncertainty. FCSC TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note
125, at 7-8.
132 For example, the Report recommended the near abolition of diversity jurisdiction, re-
serving federal jurisdiction for "certain complex cases," such as "product liability litigation •
. . involving scattered events or parties and substantial claims by numerous defendants,"
thereby removing most cases that arise under state law (including contract and non·large
sCale tort claims). FCSC REpORT, supra note 12, at 39-40. The Report also recommended the
retention of diversity jurisdiction for "[s]uits in which aliens are parties" and in inter-
pleader. ld. As an alternative to the above restrictions, the Report recommended that in-
state plaintiffs be precluded from claiming diversity jurisdiction, that the definition of di-
verse citizenship and the nature of damages be altered, and that the amount-in·controversy
requirement be increased. ld. at 42. For a discussion of how the Article III appellate judici-
ary has itself devised ways to reallocate its work and avoid some of what it perceives as less
interesting, see Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload,
1990 B.Y.D. L. REv. 3.
133 These proposals build on Supreme Court cases approving delegation of factfinding to
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social security cases from Article III jurisdiction,134 the FCSC Re-
port called (over dissents from some Committee members13G) for
the creation of a special court of disability appeals, to be staffed by
Article I judges,136 with Article III review only of "constitutional
claims" and "pure questions of law."137 In addition, the Report
proposed administrative decisionmaking for cases under the Fed-
eral Employer Liability Act and the Jones Act, Article I status for
tax court trial (but not appellate) judges, Article I decisionmaking
in federal tort claims when the matter in controversy is under
$10,000, and increased powers for bankruptcy judges and magis-
trates.13B Using the dollar amount-in-controversy as a yardstick,
the FCSC Report also used the economic value of the federal
rights at stake as one way to distinguish between business sent to
Article III and Article I courts.139 The Report proposed that some
"small"-in terms of dollars-·federal claims be sent elsewhere:
that a small claims court be created for claims under the Federal
Torts Claims Act that fall below $10,000;140 that, with the parties'
consent, the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission
(EEOC) provide binding arbitration in wrongful discharge cases,
because the "stakes" do not, from the employer's vantage, merit
non-Article III judges with review by Article III judges. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22
(1932), began the use of this line in the administrative context; in Crowell, "jurisdictional
facts" had to be reviewed de novo by an Article III court. [d. at 62-65. More recent cases
have permitted greater Article I authority over factfinding. See, e.g., Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods., 473
U.S. 568 (1985).
134 H.R. 4647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Robert E. Rains, A Specialized Court lor So'
cial Security? A Critique 01 Recent Proposals, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1, 3 (1987) (three bills,
two submitted, one in draft, with sponsorship from the Reagan administration, to "remove
all or almost all Social Security appeals" from Article III courts).
13. The chair, Joseph Weis, Senator Grassley, Mr. Dennis, and Mr. HarrelJ dissented.
FCSC REPORT, supra note 12, at 58-59.
13. [d. at 55.
131 [d.
13. [d. at 62-64, 69-72, 81-83, 76, 79-81.
139 In addition to the amount-in-controversy in diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a) (1988), the delineation between the criminal jurisdiction of magistrates and of Arti·
cle III judges is by the length of the sentence. Magistrates have jurisdiction to try misde-
meanors but not felonies-but Article III judges can "upon the court's own motion, or for
good cause shown, upon petition by ... the Government" try the case. Such petitions
"should note the novelty, importance, or complexity of the case ...." 18 U.S.C. § 3401(0),
(0, (g) (West's Supp., 1989). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 58 (as revised, t~ be effective absent
congressional action in December of 1990).
140 FCSC REPORT, supra note 12, at 81.
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litigation.141
The FCSC Report, like the writings of the commentators from
which some of these suggestions are drawn, thus provides a win-
dow into contemporary aspirations expressed for the Article ill ju-
diciary. To summarize, the claims made are that, for people to
want to be Article ill judges, one must promise them elite status;
given life tenure, to insure responsible judging, one must insure
prestige, visibility, and a small, elite peer groUp.142 In addition,
proponents of these views assume that "law" can be distinguished
from "fact"; that judges could be instructed to decide only ques-
tions of either "fact" or "law"; and that an elite cadre of judges is
best d~ployed to work at the "higher" echelons-defined either as
doing factfinding in cases involving many parties, many claims,
large amounts of money, or "significant" issues, or as working as an
appellate body to review the rulings of underlings who decide
facts.143
Factfinding, the complex and messy activity of interacting with
litigants, witnesses, and lawyers, listening to different versions of
events, attempting construction and reconstruction of those events,
and ultimately creating narratives, is second order work ("house-
keeping") under this vision.144 Further, the people who are to do
that work are not the focus of much discussion; the problems of
recruitment, status, and capacity of Article I judges are given less
attention.HI> Thus, like the housewife who is an "invisible
,., [d. at 60. See also the suggestion to limit removal of cases under the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) that are under $10,000 from federal to state court.ld. at.
43-44. Another aspect of the explanation of why "small" value cases should not. be before
Article ill judges is the claim that Article ill adjudication is more expensive for the litigants
than other adjudication, that parties with resources attempt to take strategic ad"antase by
filing in Article ill courts. See the discussion of ERISA removal, id. at 43-44.
,.. Exactly how one insures responsible judging by magistrates, bankruptcy judges, and
administrative law judges is not a subject addressed by the Report.; the assumptions might
be that their lack of life tenure and review by Article ill judges are sufficient., but one would
want to know more about retention, retirement, dismissal rates, and reversal rates before
having confidence that de facto tenure is not prevalent.
,.3 FCSC REPORT, supra note 12, at 55-58, 69-70.
,•• Suggesting the triumph of "economic man" over "literary woman:' See Robin West.,
. Economic Man lInd Literary Woman: One Contrast, 39 MERCER L. HE,'. 867 (1988); Robin
West, Law, Literature, and the Celebration of Authority, 83 N\\'. U.L. HEv. 977 (1989).
,.. For example, the Federal Courts Study Committee sent questionnaires to survey Arti-
cle ill judges but did not undertake to make formal inquiries of magistrates or bankruptcy
judges. Letter from FCSC to Article ill Judges (June 26, 1990) (on file with author). How-
ever, the Committee did receive submissions from the Division of Magistrates of the Admin-
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worker,"l46 the magistrate and bankruptcy judge are an assumed,
but not very visible, presence.U7
The analogies between housewives and lower echelon judges are
not too far from the surface of the discussion. At the hearing held
in San Diego in January of 1990 on the Tentative Report of the
Federal Courts Study Committee', a federal judge offered two com-
ments. First, he recommended giving federal magistrates a differ-
ent name. Call them, he suggested, "magistrate judges." The judge
argued that the reason to change the name was to improve the lot
of magistrates and to recognize their enormous contribution to the
federal judiciary.u8 Notice that the judge did not propose making
magistrates Article III judges. What the federal trial judge wanted
was to change their name, not their actual status; he argued that
the name change would more fairly reflect their work (which it
would) and give litigants who wanted "a judge" some comfort (al-
beit possibly based upon confusion), The proposal to adopt the
name of the more powerful party is one familiar to women in this
country; if they marry, they are expected to adopt the names of
men. Name changing can have a range of purposes and meanings.
For some women, the change in name (and the appellation "Mrs.")
may mark an apparent improvement in status but may also ob-
istrative Office of the U.S. Courts, the Committee on the Administration of the Federal
Magistrates System, and the National Council of the United States Magistrates. See FCSC
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 126, Vol. 2, section IVA. For discussion of bankruptcy issues.
see FCSC WORKING PAPERS, supra note 126, Vol. 1, at 354-71•
... DOLORES HAYDEN, supra note 24, at 111. See also Micaela Di Leonardo, The Female
World of Cards and Holidays: Women, Families, and the Work of Kinship, 12 SIGNS 440
(1987) (work of kinship crosses the boundaries between the domestic and labor perspectives
on women's work).
.., Until recently, data collected on judicial work has not included the time spent by mag-
istrates. See Richard Mandelbaum, Measuring the Work of Magistrates, 4 INSIDE LITIGA-
TION 1 (Feb. 1990) ("weighted caseload data collection" to include magistrates' work in the
future). According to Christopher E. Smith, when federal magistrates attempted to have
their opinions published in the federal reporting system, "district judges manifested their
concerns about differentiating their status from that of magistrates by vigorously opposing
and effectively blocking any effort to publish magistrates' opinions." CHRISTOPIIER E. Sr.UTII,
SUBORDINATE JUDGES, supra note 8, at 161. Another aspect of magistrates' work that gener-
ates more public visibility is that of setting bail. Id. at 166·68.
... Notes on the FCSC hearing, San Diego, Calif. (Jan. 29, 1990) (on file with author). A
name change was also 'recommended to the FCSC by the National Council of United States
Magistrates. See FCSC WORKING PAPERS, supra note 126, Vol. 2, Section IVA, at 3·4j Letter
of September 6, 1990 from Donald Abram, President of the Council to the Honorable Rob-
ert W. Kastenmeier, 1 (on file with author).
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scure commitments to oneself and may lessen one's allegiance with
others who have not obtained similar status. Will a name change
for magistrates work similarly-to mark an apparent improvement
in status but not to address the underlying evaluation of that
group as secondary?
The suggestion about a name change is one of the proposals of
the Federal Courts Study Committee that has since been trans-
lated into legislation; the August 1, 1990 House version of the 1990
Civil Justice Reform Act included proposals to rename magistrates
"Assistant United States Judges."149 Mer opposition to that
change was voiced by the Department of Justice, the Judicial Con-
ference, and the American Bar Association, the proposed bill was
revised.lIlO A1? reported out of the Judiciary Committee on Septem-
ber 18, 1990 and passed by the House on September 27, 1990, the
legislation provided that a magistrate be called a "United States
Magistrate Judge."ll>l According to the legislative hist~ry for this
section, adding the word "judge" is appropriate because:
"Judge" is an appellation commonly assigned to non-arti-
cle ill adjudicators in the federal court system.... More-
over, ... magistrates are commonly addressed as "judge"
in their courtrooms .... The provision ... is designed to
reflect more accurately the responsibilities and duties of
the office. It is not intended to affect the substantive au-
thority or jurisdiction of . . . magistrates.lI>2
The trial judge who proposed the name changes had another
·suggestion;.he urged an increase in the number of magistrates. We
need, he said, one magistrate for every two federal district Article
III judges. What role might an increased number of magistrates
play? As explained by a recent case in the Third Circuit, the "Fed-
eral Magistrates Act is intended to relieve the district courts of
certain ministerial and subordinate duties that often distract the
"9 See H.R. 5381, A Bill to Implement Certain Proposals of the Federal Courts Study
Committee, and For Other Purposes, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 206 (1990) (change of name of
United States Magistrates to "assistant United States district judge.")
,.0 Conversation with staff of the House Judiciary Committee (Sep\ember 1990).
101 See H.R. 5381, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 204 (Sept. 24, 1990) (Change of Name of
United States Magistrates).
,.. H.R. REP. No. 101-734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1990) (Federal Courts Study Commit-
tee Implementation Act of 1990).
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courts from matters that require their immediate and undivided
attention."1113 As envisioned by the FCSC Report, magistrates
should not be "autonomous" actors but, while their powers could
be enhanced, they should remain "auxiliary officers" of Article III
judges-to be "supportive and flexible."1114 Sounds, in other words,
like "women's work." As historian Nancy Cott writes, what distin-
guished the work of women from that of men in the formation of
gendered divisions of labor during the early part of the nineteenth
century was the assumption that women's work had a "constant
orientation toward the needs of others, especially men."1GG Ob-
scured are the interdependencies of and the variations in the work
of both women and men and of the work of both magistrates and
Article III judges.1116 What is clear is the value attributed to the
work of the auxiliary officer as compared with the value attributed
to the tasks of the Article III judge.
B. Judicial Essentialism
The debate about what work and prerogatives belong uniquely
to Article III judges is reminiscent of other conversations, in law
and elsewhere, about unique and intrinsic qualities of institutions
and genders. In case law about Article III, the phrase "essential
attributes of judicial power" is used to denote those activities that
neither the Executive nor the Congress can divest from the consti-
tutionally-created federal court system.1117 In the law of the tenth
amendment, "essential attributes of state sovereignty" are claimed
to be state activities that cannot be regulated by Congress.1GB In
... Government of the Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 1989) (client,
upon consultation with attorney, may consent to magistrate conducting voir dire; the court
distinguished Gomez v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2237 (1989), in which defendant had ob·
jected to magistrate conducting voir dire), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2211 (1990).
'"' FCSC REPORT, supra note 12, at 79.
... NANCY F. COTT, supra note 24, at 22.
,•• See Anna Yeatman, Women, Domestic Life and Sociology, in FEMINIST CHALLENOES:
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 86, at 157, 159 ("[W)hen the public aspect of
social existence is accorded privileged status ..• its relationship of mutual dependence to
the domestic aspect is obscured. This has the effect of making the public domain falsely
appear as self-sustaining ....").
'.7 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932) ("essential attributes of the judicial power");
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) ("essential at·
tributes of judicial power").
I •• National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976) (quoting Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 205 (1968»; Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
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discussions of feminism, the term "essentialism" has different as-
pects; one claim is about an alleged "essential" nature of women
that precedes experience,lIl9 while another is a criticism addressed
to some feminists who tend to describe some aspects of "Woman"
as unchanging across race, class, and culture.l6D
The debate about essentialism in feminism is helpful here; its
exploration of what might be meant by claims that gender has es-
sential, enduring, natural aspects can be used as a model for a sim-
ilar debate about what might be meant by claims that Article ill
courts have essential, enduring aspects. For example, an essential-
ist claim about Article ill judges could be that-either because of
life tenure and salary protection (a structural argument based on
"judicial independence") and/or presidential nomination and sen-
ate confirmation (another kind of structural argument based upon
a particular kind of selection process)-those judges are different
than judges without these attributes. Given that difference, ex-
isting prior to and apart from the work that they engage in, certain
qualities could be ascribed to Article III judges. (The parallel here
for gender is a claim that biology alone-independent of culture,
social construction, division of work, and the like-sets women and
men apart.l6l) Note that an alternative conception for judges
would be that it is not their "essence" as creatures of Article ill,
but rather the work that they do on the cases allocated to them (an
argument based upon division of laborl62) that distinguishes them
547 (1985) (quoting Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 205).
,.. See, e.g., Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130, 141-42 (1872) ("[N)ature, herself,
has always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and
woman."). For contemporary commentary, see Nancy Fraser & Linda J. Nicholson, Social
Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter between Feminism and Postmodernism in
FEMINISM!POSTMODERNISM (Linda J. Nicholson ed. 1990); R W. CONNELL. GENDER AND
POWER: SOCIETY. THE PERSON AND SEXUAL POLITICS 54-62 (1987) ("categorical theory" as con·
trasted with "practice-based theory"); Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing
Differences: The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 Fu.. L. REv. 25, 37·38 (1990)
(relying upon "experiential, not essential differences").
160 See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theo')', 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581 (1990) (arguing essentialism is dangerous because it ignores such factors as race,
class, and sexual orientation); Deborah L. Rhode, Theoretical Perspectiues on Sexual Dif·
ference, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 2·7 (Deborah Rhode edt 1990)
[hereinafter SEXUAL DIFFERENCE).
181 See, e.g., Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly·Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Femi·
nine, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 644, 646·50 (1990); Susan H. Williams, Feminism's Search for the
Feminine: Essentialism, Utopianism, and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 700 (1990).
162 DOROTHY E. SMITH. THE EVERYDAY WORLD AS PROBLEMATIC 105-45 (1987) ("stand·
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from Article I judges.
As in other essentialist arguments, empirical information is rele-
vant.163 For example, formally, Article III judges are uniquely insu-
lated by virtue of life tenure and salary protections. But in the last
few years, a few of these judges have been impeached and have
charged political motivations for their investigations.164 One would
have to know the rate at which magistrates and bankruptcy judges
have been fired or not reappointed, or have had their salaries re-
duced, to be confident about the claim that Article III judges alone
are safeguarded from supervision.16G One would also like to know
the rates of withdrawals of cases and reversals of decisions by mag-
istrates and bankruptcy judges and the corresponding numbers on
reversals of Article III trial judges by appellate judges. Similarly,
the claim about selection requires some probing: while some
United States Supreme Court nominations are subjected to inten-
sive scrutiny, others are not, and lower court nominations are
point" theorists who explain women's differences from men as based upon the nature of the
work that each sex has been assigned); EVERETT C. HUGHES, Social Role and the Diuision of
Labor, in THE SOCIOLOGICAL EYE: SELECTED PAPERS 304-10 (1971) [hereinafter TilE SOCIO-
LOGICAL EYE].
'.3 See, e.g., ELEANOR MACCOBY & CAROL JACKLIN. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFEUENCES
(197'0; Barrie Thorne, Children and Gender: Constructions and Difference, in SEXUAL Du'-
FERENCE, supra note 160, at 100-13.
,•• Former Judge Alcee L. Hastings. of Florida claimed he was the "victim of political and
racial persecution, especially by his fellow judges who simply don't like him," John P. Mac-
Kenzie, The Virtue of Impeachment, N.Y, Times, July 28, 1988, at A26, col. 1. Former
Judge Harry Claiborne of Nevada asserted that "he is the innocent victim of Government
persecution." Close the Book on Judge Claiborne, N.Y, Times, September 30, 1986, at A34,
col. 1. Former Judge Walter L. Nixon of Mississippi stated that "the case against him was
based on false testimony procured by prosecutorial abuses," Ruth Marcus, Impeaching
Judges a Long, Trying Process; Some Lawmakers Say System Wastes Congress' Time and
is Unfair to the Accused, Wash. Post, Apr. 7, 1989, at A21. Judge Robert Aguilar of Califor-
nia, recently convicted after a retrial, may face impeachment proceedings; he claimed that
an FBI agent built "a false case against [the Judge] because of his [the agent's] dislike of
the liberal judge's rulings" (Pamela A. MacLean, UPI, February 8, 1990).
,•• See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH. SUBORDINATE JUDGES, supra note 8, at 181 ("Magistrates
indicated no fears about salaries being reduced or tenure being affected because of court
decisions adversely affecting the interests of the legislative and executive branches"-in part
because an Article III judge also signs off on many decisions; the "real limitation upon mag-
istrates' independence is not the other branches of government, but the district judges who
wield such power over the magistrates' task assignments." Id, at 182), See also Frank H.
Easterbrook, "Success" and the Judicial Power, 65 IND. L. REV. 277, 279 (1990) (administra-
tive law judges "are chosen by civil service methods-and they serve for lifer) (emphasis in
original).
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. L. Rev. 951 1989-1990
1990] FEDERAL TRIAL COURTS 951
processed with relatively little public comment.166 What are the
characteristics of people who make it by the nominations process
and how do they compare with those selected, by Article ill judges,
to be magistrates and bankruptcy judges?167 One might respond
that such empiricism is not of much help, because it is the percep-
tion of invulnerability and elite status (held by Article ill judges)
and the fear of vulnerability and knowledge of second class citizen-
ship (held by magistrates and bankruptcy judges) that affect and
engender each group's understanding of their role and their capac-
ity to discharge judicial tasks.16B
But, if that argument is correct, then one would assume that the
nature of the work of the different kinds of judges reflected the
different confidence levels in their capacity to judge. The problem
is, however, that at the trial level, the tasks for all judges have
expanded over the past few decades-to embrace settlement ef-
forts, pretrial management, and litigant supervision, as well as
factfinding and adjudication.169 At the same time, the formal dif-
ferentiation among trial judges (Article III district judges, magis-
trates, and bankruptcy judges) has eroded. At many levels, all
three sets of judges do all of the activities-settlement, pretrial
management, litigant supervision, factfinding, adjudication-now
understood to comprise the work of the trial bench.170 Moreover,
,•• Since 1980, 472 individuals have been nominated to the federal bench, 410 by Presi-
dent Reagan and 62 by President Bush. Of those nominated, 440 were confirmed b)' the
Senate, and 3 were rejected (Robert Bork, Bernard Siegan, Jefferson Sessions III). Twenty-
nine nominations (such as that of 'Douglas Ginsberg) were withdrawn or the confirmation
period lapsed. Conversation with Staff Member, the Alliance for Justice (Aug. 7, 1990).
,., As of 1986, almost 60% of magistrates had been "[f]ederal court personnel [which)
includes former law clerks, assistant U.S. attorneys, U.S. attorneys, federal defenders, clerks
of court, bankruptcy judges, and federal probation officers." Christopher E. Smith, Who are
the U.S. Magistrates?, supra note 129, at 147 (1987). Smith thus concluded that "former
court personnel are in an advantageous position by virtue of the judge's familiarity with
them." Id. (also giving descriptions of age, gender, and race, as well as educational and legal
backgrounds of magistrates). For description of the process by which administroth'e law
judges are selected and the role played by the Veterans Preference Act, see Jeffrey S. Lub-
bers, supra note 10, at 113-19.
,•• But see Thomas E. Carlson, supra note 12, at 558·59 (majority of lawyers surveyed
believed that bankruptcy appellate panels made better decisions than did Article III trial
judges).
,•• See Laura Macklin, Promoting Settlement, Foregoing the Facts, 14 N.V.U. REv. 1.. &
Soc. CHANGE 575 (1986).
110 For a discussion of magistrates' work, see CARROLL SERON, THE RoLES OF MAGISTRATES:
NINE CASE STUDIES (1985); CARROLL SERON, THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES IN FEDERAL DIS-
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. L. Rev. 952 1989-1990
952 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [V01. 24:909
proposed legislation to implement certain of the FCSC proposals
would have increased the overlap of activities. Under the August 1,
1990 House version of the bill, magistrates were to be authorized to
impose contempt under certain circumstancesjl71 litigants' consent
to decisionmaking by bankruptcy judges would have been as-
sumed;172 and appellate courts would have been authorized to cre-
ate "bankruptcy appellate panels" (comprised of three bankruptcy
judges) to hear (upon parties' consent) appeals from decisions of
bankruptcy judges.173 Under a recent version of the Senate bill to
improve the "civil justice system," both magistrates and Article III
trial judges are to be authorized to supervise pretrial proceed-
ings.174 While Article III trial judges and magistrates do not cur-
rently have identical jobs, the general trend since the creation of
the magistrate system in 1968 has been in the direction of greater
overlap-in terms of the jurisdictional authority and the nature of
the work permitted to magistrates.176 The animating assumptions
behind this trend are that, as a matter of constitutional law, liti-
gant consent and the possibility of Article III involvement at either
TRICT COURTS (1983); Carroll Seron, The Professional Project of Parajudges: The Case of
U.S. Magistrates, 22 L. & SOC'y REV. 557 (1988). On the work of bankruptcy judges, seo
Jeffrey T. Ferriell, Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judge-
ship Act of 1984, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 135-96 (1989); Michael A. Hiltzik, Court Cases
Soar; Bankruptcy: A System Under Stress, L.A. Times, Jul. 26, 1987 at 1, col. 1. For a
discussion of Article III trial judges, see Robert Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case
Manager: The New Role of Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770
(1981); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982); New Curriculum
Unveiled to Orient Judges, 22 THIRD BRANCH 9 (July 1990) (importanco of caso
management).
171 H.R. 5381 (August 1, 1990 version), lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 206, 207 (1990). Thoso
proposals are drawn from recommendations made by the Committee on tho Administration
of the Federal Magistrates System (of the Judicial Conference) to the FCSC. Sec FCSC
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 126, Vol. 2, § IV ("Magistrates Issues").
172 H.R. 5381 (August 1, 1990 version), lOlst Cong., 2d Sess, § 114 (1990).
173 [d. at § 115. Currently, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has the only func-
tioning bankruptcy appellate panel. See FCSC REPORT, supra note 12, at 74; Thomas E.
Carlson, supra note 12, at 557.
17. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, S. 2648, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. § 473(a)(3)
(1990) (the "Biden Bill"), currently pending, provides for "early and ongoing control of tho
pretrial process through involvement of a judicial officer"). See also H.R. 3898, lOlst Cong.,
1st Sess. (1990) (Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990). Note that an earlier version of that
legislation had provided that Article III judges-"and not a magistrato"-conduct
mandatory pretrial conferences. See S. 2027, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
17. See Richard Mandelbaum, U.S. Magistrates: Part of the Problem or a Key to the
Solution?, 4 INSIDE LITIGATION 1 (Feb. 1990).
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the trial or appellate stages respond to objections to non-Article ill
adjudication,176 and that, as a matter of policy, the tasks so dele-
gated do not require whatever special qualities Article ill judges
have.
The central differences that remain are that Article ill trial
judges are fewer in number than non-Article III judges, are
claimed to be superior to non-Article III judges, are currently given
more power, and are paid more for their work.177 (In this way,
some of the status of Article III judges depends, in part, upon the
existence of non-Article III judges, just as being "manly" may de-
pend upon distancing oneself from "womanly" traits.) Because Ar-
ticle III judges are thus perceived to be high-value workers,
whatever work is exclusively theirs is, in turn, understood to be the
most "important" work. The work that is sent elsewhere ("down")
is already conceived to be or becomes designated as the drudgery,
the "routine," the "housekeeping."
IV. VALUATIONS OF JUDGING AND OF "HOUSEKEEPING"
If the deployment of the word "housekeeping" and the allocation
of work were not sufficient to underscore the parallels between
gender construction and the valuation of trial court judges, the
words used to describe the procedure by which adjudication occurs
116 See Richard Fallon, supra note 16, at 974·91. One current statement is that Congress
cannot, constitutionally, give Article I courts the "plenary powers of Article III courts." See
In re United Mo. Bank of Kansas City, 901 F.2d 1449, 1452 (8th Cir. 1990) lbankruptcy
judge has no statutory authority to conduct jury trials).
1'Z7 Magistrates and bankruptcy judges may earn 92'70 ($88,872) of what Article III trial
judges earn ($96,600); the Judicial Conference establishes the salary "subject to the statu-
tory ceiling;" under a standing resolution, pay raises for bankruptcy judges result in pay
raises for most full-time magistrates. Some full-time magistrates, however, are paid leiS
than others. FCSC WORKING PAPERS, supra note 126, VoL 2, § IV, at 6; see also Lhing
Justices and Judges as of 07-01-90 (data from the Committee on the Administration of the
Federal Magistrates System) (on file with author). One interesting wrinkle is that. because
bankruptcy judges and magistrates do not have life tenure, their retirement plans Veit dif-
ferently than do Article III judges. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 377(a) (1988) with 28 U.S.C. § 371
(1988).
Full-time magistrates are each assigned one secretary, one courtroom deputy, and one law
clerk; Article III trial judges are assigned one secretary, two law clerks, and one court clerk.
Conversation with staff members of the Magistrates Division of the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts (June 25, 1990). Magistrates' offices may also be less comfortable than those
of Article III judges. See Christopher E. Smith, The Del!elopment 01 a Judicial Office:
United States Magistrates and the Struggle for Status, 14 J. LEGAL PROF 175. 191-92
(1989).
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. L. Rev. 954 1989-1990
954 . GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:909
bring "home" the point. Charles Clark, dean of Yale Law School,
judge on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and a major
participant in the drafting of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, spoke of his enterprise-the framing of rules of proce-
dure-as follows:
A handmaid, no matter how devoted, seems never averse
to becoming mistress of a household should opportunity
offer. Just so do rules of procedure tend to assume a too
obtrusive place in the attentions of judges and law-
yers-unless, indeed, they are continually restricted to
their proper and subordinate role.178
Clark asked: "What concrete steps may be taken to keep procedure
in its modest position as handmaid?"179 and then answered that
question by claiming the "necessity of procedur~" to equity, fair-
ness, and impartiality. As he explained:
Regular habits are necessary in all daily tasks. A house-
hold becomes indeed disorganized if its head overturns
even the settled round of daily meals. The process of ad-
judication requires such settled habits the more that liti-
gants may not be prejudiced by deviation therefrom, and
that impartiality in fact, and in appearance to the parties
and the public, shall be maintained.ISO
Clark thus portrayed procedure and the structure of adjudica-
tion as Woman, as both trivial and all important. Having first
equated his reform with the modest role of "handmaid," Clark en-
ded his essay (published the year that the federal national proce-
dural rules were to take effect) by claiming that the new federal
rules would not only "operate throughout the entire establishment
of national courts, but may well serve to exorcise a complex proce-
dure from the state courts as well."lSI From "handmaid" to "impe-
"8 Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 297 (1938), reprinted in
PROCEDURE-THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS OF CHARLES E. CLARK 69 (Charlcs Alan
Wright & Harry M. Reasoner eds. 1965) [hereinafter PROCEDURE-THE HANDMAID].
178 PROCEDURE-THE HANDMAID, supra note 178, at 70.
18. [d.
'" [d. at 84. Clark was somewhat accurate in his prediction that federal rulcs would bo
used in the states: some half of the states adopted rules based upon them. See John B.
Oakely & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court
Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367 (1986). On the other hand, not all por-
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rialist" in one short essay. Nancy Cott wrote a description of nine-
teenth-century images of women: "To be idealized, yet rejected by
men-the object of yearning, and yet of scorn-was the fate of the
home-as-workplace. Women's work (indeed women's very charac-
ter, viewed as essentially conditioned by the home) shared in that
simultaneous glorification and devaluation.Ul82 As the twentieth
century ends, "housekeeping" and "handmaid" remain words used
in law to denote lesser order activities.183
The recent commentary and proposals on federal court jurisdic-
tion and the use of the words "housekeeping" and "handmaid" are
part of a larger struggle of the value of work and the meaning of
words which is, in turn, at the core of feminist concerns.184 The
questions posed are not unique to Article I and Article ill courts,
to the allocation of jurisdiction, and to procedure; these questions
underlie arguments about comparable worth;18li about professional-
ization and the ranking of occupations;186 about sex segregation in
ceive those rules as providing a simplified system. See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudi-
catory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHt L. REv. 494 (1986).
182 NANCY F. COIT, supra note 24, at 62. See also Frances Olsen, The Famil:>' and the
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1497 (1983) (persistence
of ideology of women's sphere as the home even as women have entered the marketplace).
183 See, in addition to the cases cited supra notes 48-56 and 63-72, the reference to Clark
and, perhaps ironically, to Margaret Atwood's THE HANDMAID'S TALE (1986) in the title used
by David M. Trubek, The Handmaiden's Revenge: On Reading and Using the Neu:er Soci-
ology of Civil Procedure, 51 LAW & CONTEl\U'. PROBS. 111, 121 (1988) ("As the handmaiden
to substantive law, procedure shares" the substantive legal goal of post-Realist thought
"that the purpose of ... civil law is to empower the self[;] [s]tarted as a largely technical
handmaiden to the work of mainstream reformers, the sociology of civil procedure is moving
toward a full-blown critical practice ••• [which] would be the true handmaiden's revenge."
Id. at 134). See also James F. Ponsoldt, Balancing Government Efficienc;;' and the Protec-
tion of Individual Liberties: An Analysis of the Conflict betu:een Executice Branch
"Housekeeping" Regulations and Criminal Defendants' Rights to a Constitutionall;;· Fair
Trial, 19 HARv. CR-CL. L. REV. 349 (1984) (about federal "housekeeping statute").
18( See BETI'lNA APTHEKER, TAPESTRlES OF LIFE: WOMEN'S WORK, WOMEN'S CONSCIOUS:''ESS.
AND THE MEANING OF DAILY EXPERIENCE (1989); BARBARA HERRNSTEIN SMITH, CONTINGENCIES
OF VALUE (1988).
1M See Roslyn L. Feldberg, Comparable Worth: Tou:ard Theory and Practice in the
United States, 10 SIGNS 311, 324 (1984) ("the debate is about social values and priorities
underlying the wage hierarchy"); Heidi Hartmann, Capitalism, Patriarch;;', and Job Segre-
gation by Sex, 1 SIGNS 137, 168 (1976) ("the maintenance of job segregation by sex is a key
root of women's status"). See generally Symposium: Approaching Pa)' Equit;;· through
Comparable Worth, 45 J. Soc. ISSUES 1 (1989).
188 EvERETT C. HUGHES, The Humble and the Proud: the Comparative Stud;;· of Occupa-
tions, in THE SOCIOLOGICAL EYE, supra note 162, at 417. See also CmuSTINE B. HARRINGTON
& JANET RIFKIN, THE GENDER ORGANIZATION OF MEDIATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE F£!'Ul':JZA-
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the workplace;187 and about the evaluation of scientific inquiry.186
Two kinds of relationships between trial judges' work and
women's household work are relevant; the first relies upon a set of
feminist theories loosely grouped as "cultural feminism"-which
refers to feminists who appreciate women's engagement with and
nurturance of other human beings and who celebrate "women's
culture" for its interrelatedness.169 Cultural feminists might point
to the nature of some of the tasks that "less important" judges are
assigned and note that the content of the work often requires talk-
ing with and dealing with lawyers and (occasionally) litigants and
witnesses. Some of that work might require intensive interpersonal
dealings, and some of the people with whom the work is done may
themselves not be of high social or economic status. Given this
"people-orientation," cultural feminists might argue for an identifi-
cation of first-tier judging with skills traditionally associated with
women and argue for reclaiming the value of that work.19D Another
conception (sometimes denominated "radical feminism" and some-
times posed in opposition to cultural feminism) is wary of claims
about "women's ways," which may instead be the ways of the pow-
erless and subordinated.191 "Power," "domination," "energy," and
"ability"192 are central to the analysis; lower court judges' work
TION OF LEGAL PRACTICE 44 (Institute for Legal Studies Working Paper No.4, Feb. 1989)
("new fields of legal work [such as mediation] ••• and new institutions to handle cases, often
labeled 'routine cases' and even called 'garbage cases' ••. become gendered.").
187 See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories about Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations
of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argu-
ment, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990).
188 SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM 58-81 (1988) (construction of
certain activities in doing scientific research as more important than others).
180 See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN ADIFFERENT VOICE (1982). Note that some commenta-
tors, such as Alice Echols, The New Feminism of Yin and Yang in POWERS OF DESIIlE: TilE
POLITICS OF SEXUALITY (Ann Sriitow, Christine Stansell, & Sharon Thompson eds. 1983),
argue that cultural feminists are also essentialists, but while Gilligan claims a distinct voice
for women, she is not clear about the sources; she relies a good deal on the relationship
between children and their mothers. CAROL GILLIGAN, supra, at 7-23,
10. One caveat here: many cultural feminists have also been in the forefront of the cri-
tique of adjudication itself as premised upon a male model of hierarchy, See, e.g., Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Pro-
cess, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); Janet Rifkin, Mediation from a Feminist Per-
spective: Promise and Problems, 2 J.L. & INEQUALITY 21 (1984)•
... See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987).
100 NANCY C.M. HARTSOCK, MONEY, SEX, AND POWER: TOWARD AFEMINIST HISTOlliCAL MA-
TERIALISM 210-26 (1983).
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may be identified with women because lower court judges, like
women, are at the bottom of a hierarchy.
"Housekeeping" relates to both of these approaches, for that
work has been identified as work of nurturing, as work of lesser
importance, and as work that belongs particularly to women. But
"housekeeping" need not be understood only in pejorative terms
nor exclusively as the domain of women. Retrieving-without ro-
manticizing-the importance of "humbleU193 activities, aclmowl-
edging the power in the work of maintenance and of the organiza-
tion of daily structures, and reallocating obligations for caretaking
are challenges for feminism. "[I]f the women's movement has
taught us anything, it is that we must all share the housework but
must also get the chance to gaze at the stars."194 The federal courts
offer one opportunity for taking on those challenges.
Indeed feminist theory, with its focus upon gender, may be par-
ticularly helpful in this context. Both judges and women are often
put in situations in which they are asked to respond to the needs
of others, and both groups face a similar problem: that their work
does ,not receive much attention absent extraordinary circum-
stances; that their presence is assumed, but not much provided for.
The -question-faced by women in households and by judges in
courts across the country -is how to have enough resources and
energy to respond to unending needs.1911
One feminist response to the problems of underattention and
undervaluation is "naming";196 the provision of detailed descrip-
,.3 See generally SUSAN MOLLER aKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND TilE FAMILY (1989); FEMINIST
CHALLENGES: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 86.
1.. Elaine Showalter, Introduction: The Feminist Critical Reuolution, in TUE NEW FEMI-
NIST CRITICISM: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, LITERATURE, AND THEORY 3, 16 (Elaine Showalter ed.
1985).
,•• As one federal district judge, in response to a questionnaire sent by the FCSC. put it:
"There are simply too many civil cases to push through the system, too many motions, and
far, far too many criminal cases, for any human being to be satisfied that he or she is dis-
pensing justice, rather than pushing cases and papers out the door." (on file with author).
,•• See generally CATHARINE A MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST TIlEOR\' OF TilE STATE
83-105 (1989) (consciousness raising and feminist methodology); ADRIENNE RlCIl, Compul-
sory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence (1980), in BLOOD, BREAD, AND POETRY: SE-
LECTED PROSE 1979-1985 23 (1986); Marie Withers Osmond & Barrie Thorne. Feminist The-
ories: The Social Construction of Gender in Families and Society, in SOURCEBOOK OF
FAMILY THEORIES AND METHODS: A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH (Pauline Boss, William Dohert)·,
Ralph LaRossa, Walter Schumm & Suzanne Steinmetz eds. forthcoming) (pp. 3-4 of manu-
script on file with author).
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tions of the "lesser" work helps to illuminate the range of skills
involved, the need for talented individuals to do the work, the
power of the activity, and the obligation of those who benefit from
such work to acknowledge, share in, and appreciate it. Take, for
example, "housekeeping"-the ·specific work of keeping a house.
Some would simply encapsulate that activity as a mixture of rou-
tine drudgery and caretaking and hope to leave it to others or as-
sume some of the tasks begrudgingly. That vision is too narrow; for
example, in the nineteenth century, housekeeping included "mak-
ing cloth and clothing . . . knitting gloves and stockings, baking,
brewing, preserving food, churning butter, gardening, nursing the
sick, making candles or soap, washing, ironing, scouring, quilting
with neighbors, and ... entertaining visitors."197 While some of the
tasks have changed, the list of activities that would today be called
"housekeeping" (in the sense of involvement with one's home) in-
cludes the providing of clothes; the obtaining and preparation of
food; the provision of care for children, for the ill, for elders; the
creation and maintenance of a home, its cleaning, and upkeep; and
the preparation for holiday celebrations. Sadly, in the twentieth
century, feminist historians had to document and explain that
these tasks were "work." Alice Kessler-Harris entitled a book
Women Have Always Worked;198 Ann Oakley called her book Wo-
man's Work: The Housewife, Past and Present,199 while David
Katzman and Phyllis Palmer focused specifically on the· work of
home maintenance by those in "domestic service" and the "class,
race, and ethnic" stratification of that work in the twentieth
century.200
"Naming" some of the presumably "lesser" order work of the
federal courts may be similarly illuminating. Article III judges send
a disproportionate number of "prisoner petitions" and "social se-
curity" cases to magistrates.201 (Despite reported distress at the
,.7 NANCY F. COIT, supra note 24, at 41.
I •• ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, WOMEN HAVE ALWAYS WORKED (1981).
,•• ANN OAKLEY, WOMAN'S WORK: THE HOUSEWIFE, PAST AND PRESENT (1976).
2•• DAVID M. KATZMAN, SEVEN DAYS AWEEK: WOMEN AND DOMESTIC SERVICE IN 1NDUSTIll-
ALIZING AMERICA (1978); Phyllis Palmer, Housework and Domestic Labor: Racial and Tech-
nological Change, in My TROUBLES ARE GOING TO HAVE TROUBLE WITH ME: EVERYDAY TRIALS
AND TRIUMPHS OF WOMEN WORKERS 80 (Karen Brodkin Sacks & Dorothy Remy cds. 1984).
201 "[I]n 1988 magistrates disposed of 34,308 civil 'proceedings and cases,' and of thosc,
25,611 (75%) were prisoner petitions involving either civil rights, or habeas corpus, which
represents 69% of all prisoner petitions terminated that year. Another 7,312 (21%) wcr.c
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volume of drug prosecutions and the burden of the sentencing
guidelines, Article III judges have not yet conceived of a means to
shift that work within their courts to others, but many do advocate
relocating those cases to state courts.202) Both prisoner petitions
and social security cases are often filed pro se-without lawyers
who can provide extensive supporting documentation and legal ar-
gument and who can facilitate communication between litigant and
judge.203 In "prisoner petitions," prisoners claim either that they
are unconstitutionally incarcerated and should be freed or retried,
or ·that they are housed in conditions that violate their constitu-
tional rights. Deciding some of these cases requires learning about
gruesome crimes and asking oneself about fidelity to principles like
"due process" of law and "right to counsel." Although documen-
tary information may be scarce Qr poorly presented and factual
disputes are claimed, evidentiary hearings are a rarity.2lH Most of
social security cases, or over half of the total number of social security cases terminated that
year." Lauren K. Robel, supra note 132, at 3 (footnotes omitted). Use of magistrates in
particular categories of cases is of concern to the Division of Magistrates and the Committee
on the Administration of the Federal Magistrates System; that group argued that "a heavy
concentration of these types of cases tends to create a specialist position contrary to the
generalist concept underlying the magistrate system." FCSC WORKING PAPERS, supra note
126, Vol. 2, § IV ("Magistrates Issues"). However, the assignments of magistrates vary from
district to district and judge to judge. See John P. Mayer, Results of Questionnaires on Use
of Magistrates in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
(June 26, 1990) (on file with author).
'0' See, e.g., FCSC REPORT, supra note 12, at 35-38.
• 03 The growing pro se docket-at both trial and appellate levels-is a subject of increas-
ing concern to judges. See letters from Gilbert Merritt, Chief Judge of the Sixth Circuit, to
Judith Resnik (on file with author). In the Sixth Circuit alone, pro se appellate filings num-
bers in 1989 were 1440 out of about 4400, or 32.7%. Id. As of June, 1990, pro se filings were
38.5% of the monthly appellate filings. Statistical Report of the Sixth Circuit as of June 3D,
1990, Table 4a (on file with author). In a year, that court decides from 900-1100 pro se
cases, the majority of which involve prisoners' claims; pro se cases consume most of the
work time of staff attorneys.
... Charles D. Weisselberg, Evidentiary Hearings in Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REv. 131, 166-67 (Utrial"-i.e., factfinding hearings-occurred in 1988 in 1.11% of
the habeas corpus petitions, in contrast to a trial rate of 5.03% in other "civil cases"). Given
the relative infrequency of trial in these cases, one might then assume that Article III judges
are delegating them so as to preserve their time for hearing witnesses in other cases. The
difficulty with that assumption is that Article III appellate judges also delegate, dispropor-
tionately, prisoner and social security appeals to staff attorneys. See Lauren K. Robel, The
Privatization Continuum: Views from the Bench (June 1990) (manuscript on file \\ith au-
thor) (oral arguments occur less frequently, opinions are published less frequently, and cen-
tral staff are given more authority in social security and prisoner cases than in other cases).
A final possibility is that the legal issues in prisoner and social security cases are less com-
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the decisions are made "on the papers."2011
Other cases frequently sent to magistrates involve social security
claims. Those are the cases in which one argument made is that
the government has wrongly terminated benefits for individuals
claiming to be disabled. The claimant argues the existence of a
physical or mental disability that interferes with the capacity to
work; the government disputes it, and the judge must assess
whether the evidence was sufficient to terminate benefits.20o In ad-
dition to und~rstanding applicable regulations, described by one
author as "highly technical and complex,"207 the decisionmaker
must also evaluate medical evidence and information about voca-
tional skills and then assess the credibility of witnesses. The vast
bulk of these cases are decided by administrative law judges;208
claimants can then seek review in "the federal courts" at both the
trial and appellate levels. In the mid-1980s, administrative deci-
sionmaking was challenged as illegal under the governing stat-
utes,209 and federal courts received a relatively large number of so-
cial security "appeals." After federal courts ruled in a series of
plex than in other areas of law. My own experience attempting to teach the "law" of habeas
corpus to third-year law students undermines that assumption; that topic involves an intri·
cate set of legal rulings that are difficult io explain. The multilayered doctrines have been
the source of a number of Supreme Court cases in the last decade and now require every
trial level judge to follow a multi-step decision-tree to determine whether he or she has
jurisdiction to consider the merits of habeas cases. See, e.g., Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257
(1990); Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990).
20' "The magistrates have an interest in seeing prisoners' cases dismissed, not simply for
their functional role as gatekeepers and filterers, but in a personal sense because it permits
them to avoid holding conferences and hearings with a class of potentially difficult and hos-
tile litigants." CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, SUBORDINATE JUDGES, supra note 8, at 177.
206 A detailed description of the process is described in Richard E. Levy, supra note 14, at
468-76. One major issue is an individual's "residual functioning capacity." See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.945, 404.1545, 404.1567 (1988). Christopher E. Smith reports that "[slome magistrates
have said that any [slocial [slecurity decision can be upheld because there is nearly always
medical evidence supporting both parties upon which a decision could be based either way."
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, SUBORDINATE JUDGES, supra note 8, at 177.
207 Richard E. Levy, supra note 14, at 467.
208 In 1988, Administrative Law Judges conducted hearings in 290,393 cases. ld. tit 481.
(Table 2, Administrative Caseload).
206 The Social Security Administration "vastly expanded the number of impairments that
were regarded as non-severe, disregarded the relationship between a particular impairment
and a claimant's prior work, and refused to consider the combined effects of impairments
that were regarded individually as non-severe." Richard Levy, supra note 14, at 491 (foot·
notes omitted).
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cases,210 both administrative and statutory changes occurred, and
filings diminished.211
In many of the disability cases filed, the questions involve find-
ing "facts" about the relationship between an individual's de-
scribed experience of pain and her or his capacity to obtain gainful
employment.212 Without the benefits, many people, already finan-
cially vulnerable, could become even poorer. Not only are these
cases often filed by litigants who lack lawyers but the claims made
are themselves exceedingly difficult to articulate. "Physical pain
does not simply resist language but actively destroys it, bringing
about an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to
the sounds and cries a human being makes before language is
learned."213
In' short, many cases sent to magistrates involve depen-
dency-dependency in the sense that the individuals are already
dependent upon the state and either claim to be or may soon be in
more desperate straits, and dependency in the sense that these liti-
gants are dependent more on the trial judge for assistance, inter-
pretation, and patience than are those who are able to afford am-
ple lawyering. Further, these cases may also generate strong
reactions from decisionmakers. A decisionmaker may well feel
powerless-powerless to affect an individual's pain or to interpret
rules in a manner that responds to, let alone alleviates, suffering.
In some cases, a decisionmaker may feel overwhelmed or an-
gered-that prisoners convicted of harming others att.empt to en-
list judicial resources, that a long queue of complainants wait, and
that some complaints seem minor, if not manufactured, and take
time from other cases. In a few instances, a decisionmaker may feel
2'0 See Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Break-
down of the Rule of Law: A Response To Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.,J. 801 (1990).
2ll In 1987, 12,628 disability cases-constituting 5.3% of the civil caselo3d-.....ere filed in
federal trial courts; 982 appeals, or 3.2%, were filed in the courts of appeals. Richard E.
Levy, supra note 14, at 507 n.254.
2'2 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (worker must demonstrate "physical or mental im-
pairment .•• of such severity that" she or he is "unable to do ••• previous work" lind that
such inability renders the worker unable, "considering ... age, education, and work experi.
ence, [to] engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy"). For a period of time in the 19805, the Social Security Administration took the
position that a claimant's "subjective" descriptions of pain were "irrelevant." See Richard
E. Levy, supra note 14, at 493 (footnote .omitted).
2'3 ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF TIlE WORLD 4
(1985).
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. L. Rev. 962 1989-1990
962 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:909
joyous-that an agency of the United States government is pre-
vented from wrongfully withholding benefits to individuals desper-
ately in need, that an individual exploiting a system is stopped,
that a person wrongfully incarcerated is freed. In all instances, the
decisionmaker holds the power to create a record, to state the
events that would thereafter be given the status of "fact." With
"naming" comes more appreciation of the nature of the demands
placed upon the judge assigned to such work and of the powers
held.214
A second feminist response to problems of valuation is to point
to the knowledge that can be gained from actually undertaking the
activities assigned to women in this society. For example, Sara
Ruddick argues that being a "mother" (a socially-based, rather
than a biologically-based category) involves a complex set of tasks
in which one is both very powerful (vis-a-vis an utterly dependent
infant) and powerless (to protect a child from forces such as war
and illness).2Ili Ruddick seeks to bring "maternal thinking" to bear
on political discourse so as to incorporate into "public" decision-
making the attitudes and practices acquired during the activity of
caretaking. If one shares respect for knowledge gained from prac-
tice and vantage point, as do pragmatists and standpoint theo-
rists,2lG then specialization and segregation of certain kinds of
work-be it caring for children or deciding prisoner petitions-is
troublesome; the knowledge gained from that activity may well in-
form other, less "obviously" related work.217 Decisionmakers who
21. Cf. EVELYN NAKANO GLENN, The Meaning of Demeaning Work, in ISSEI, NISEI, WAil
BRIDE 165-89 (1986) (the "dirty work" in occupations and the ways in which domestic work·
ers, whose jobs are assumed to involve principally "dirty work," create hierarchies of tasks).
21' SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD APOLITICS OF PEACE (1989); Sara Rud·
dick, Maternal Thinking, 6 FEMINIST STUD. 342 (1980).
2.6 See generally Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal The·
ory, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 1990). See also Martha Minow, The Supreme Court,
1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 45·50 (1987)j NANCY C.M.
HARTSOCK, supra note 192, at 234-47.
211 See, e.g., Susan Glaspell, A Jury of Her Peers, first published in EVERY WEEK (March
15,1917), reprinted in ROBERT M. COVER, OWEN M. FISS, & JUDITH RESNIK, PROCEDUIIE 1168·
85 (1988); Annette Kolodny, A Map for Rereading: Gender and the Interpretation of Liter·
ary Texts, in THE NEW FEMINIST CRITICISM: WOMEN, LITERATURE, THEORY 46, 55·58 (Elaine
Showalter ed. 1985) (the women in Glaspell's short story "recognize the profoundly sex·
linked world of meaning which they inhabit; to discover how specialized is their ability to
read that world is to discover anew their own shared isolation within it"). See also SUSAN
MOLLER OKIN, supra note 193, at 126, 179j Martha Minow, supra note 216, at 79·82,
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have no exposure to certain kinds of cases may be impoverished
when deciding either questions of law or other questions presented
in the "imp'ortant" cases reserved for elite judges.21B Deci-
sionmakers who have only exposure to the "routine" work may
seek only to escape from that burden.219
Taking care of people is not much valued in this society. Feeling
bad about the state of society and its problems is uncomfortable.
Dealing with unclear and conflicting claims about "what hap-
pened" is frustrating. Adjudicating legal claims presented without
lawyers' professional help is particularly burdensome. One could
thus describe all of that work as the "routine," the factfinding in
individual instances, the painful realities of lives of many in the
United States.220 One might then search for a docket rich with the
"exotic" -or live in a world of appeals, in which no actual needy,
anxious, engaging, manipulative, or charming litigant has ever to
be confronted. Yet the world of appeals also has its routines, its
pains, its chores. Appellate judges must act in concert, must enlist
others in agreement before they can render decisions. Appellate
judges are bound and limited by records; they cannot (or should
not) alter the facts as set forth by those below, and they must rely
on those below to implement (rather than to subvert) their rulings.
Trial judges are removed from the impact of their rulings but
sometimes a bit of information trickles back; appellate judges are
all the more removed from the experiences (sometimes rewarding,
sometimes depressing) of seeing their rulings translated into events
in individuals' lives. Yet the limits and tedium of appellate work
are not often detailed in the effort to reserve that work for an elite
cadre of judges.
Neither the federal courts nor the Federal Courts Study Com-
mittee invented the idea that some work is to be avoided if possi-
ble, that some cases are of "lesser order" than others.:Z21 The ques-
". See. for example. the recommendation of the FCSC Report that Article III courts only
consider "constitutional claims and questions of law." FCSC REPORT. supra note 12, at 55-
56.
21. See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, SUBORDINATE JUDGES. supra note 8, at 177-78 (magistrate
speciali2ation. as the "primary judges" for prisoner and social security claimants. may pro-
duce "bored. stultified. and ineffective" judges).
••• According to Christopher E. Smith: "The general impression conveyed by most magis-
trates is that Social Security and prisoner cases are routine and burdensome, but unavoida-
ble." Id. at 175.
••~ See, e.g., DAVID M KATZMAN. supra note 200. at 278 ("Whether the work was per-
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tion is whether one wants to endorse the hierarchies currently
under construction or argue for others (or, more radically and at
least thus far empirically unsuccessfully, for the abolition of hier-
archy). A good deal of legal academic education reinforces the hier-
archy set forth above; many law professors focus on appellate deci-
sionmaking and the abstract principles of law, thus both giving
visibility to and reiterating the value of those activities.222 The
work that appears to affect a larger number of individuals (prece-
dent-setting opinions, in this context) is described and valued
more than the work of relating to the circumstances of fewer peo-
ple (factfinding in individual cases). It is, I believe, the feminist
enterprise (and difficult task) of identifying, understanding, reas-
sessing, and reallocating "housekeeping"-the daily, sometimes
powerful, poignant, and compelling, sometimes repetitive and non-
engaging, activities that nourish oneself and others. That reassess-
ment is critical to thinking about how to allocate work among all
judges-be they denominated "Article III" or "Article I"-sitting
on trial and appellate courts.223
formed by paid labor or by housewives themselves, the low status and stigma [of domestic
service] remained unchanged."); Tony Mauro, The Sad Case of the Ignored Case, Legal
Times of Wash., Mar. 19, 1990, at 9 (United States Supreme Court decision in Sullivan v.
Zebley, 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990), involving the Social Security Administration's unlawfully
stringent test for the provision of benefits for disabled children "fairly shimmers with signif.
icance" but was ignored by the press).
222 For discussion of the question of the canon in legal education, see Carolyn Heilbrun &
Judith Resnik, Convergences: Law, Literature, and Feminism, 99 YALE L.J. 1913, 1942·1948
(1990).
223 As Joan Wallach Scott writes, "The history of feminist thought is a history of tho
refusal of the hierarchical construction of the relationship between male and female in its
specific contexts and an attempt to reverse or displace its operations." GENDER AND TilE
POLITICS OF HISTORY 41 (1988).
